In Zappone v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 349 Md. 45, 706 A.2d 1060 (1998), Zappone, a 62-year-old businessman, was induced by the fraudulent misrepresentations of a licensed general agent of Liberty Life Insurance Company to purchase a large life insurance policy. 349 Md. at 52-56. Upon discovering that he had been duped, Zappone filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against the agent, Liberty Life, and First Financial, the licensed managing general agency, for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence. Id. at 56. After dismissing one count and granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on two other counts, the circuit court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the remaining counts of the complaint because "the remedial provisions of the Insurance Code constituted the exclusive remedy for all claims of unfair or deceptive trade practices by insurers or insurance agents in connection with the sale of insurance." Id. at 57. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court on the ground that the statutory remedy provided by the Insurance Code was neither exclusive nor primary but concurrent with any judicial remedy that Zappone had. Id. The Court began its analysis of Zappone's claims by explaining that "whenever the Legislature provides an administrative and judicial review remedy for a particular matter or matters, the relationship between that administrative remedy and a possible alternative judicial remedy will ordinary fall into one of three categories." 349 Md. at 60. The administrative remedy may be exclusive, primary, or concurrent. 349 Md. at 60-61. If the administrative remedy is exclusive then the complainant is precluded from filing an independent action in the courts, even after exhausting administrative remedies. Id. at 60. In Zappone, the Court of Appeals stated that an administrative remedy is not presumptively exclusive. "Where neither the statutory language nor the legislative history disclose an intent that the administrative remedy is to be exclusive, and where there is an alternative judicial remedy under another statute or under common law or equitable principles, there is no presumption that the administrative remedy was intended to be exclusive." Id. at 63. If an administrative remedy is primary and not exclusive, the complainant may seek redress by filing an independent judicial action. Id. at 60. The complainant must first, however, "invoke and exhaust the administrative remedy, and seek judicial review of an adverse administrative decision, before a court can properly adjudicate the merits of the alternative judicial remedy." Id. Moreover, in the absence of statutory or legislative history to the contrary, the Court stated that there is "a presumption that the administrative remedy is intended to be primary, and that a claimant cannot maintain the alternative judicial action without first invoking and exhausting the administrative remedy." Id. at 63. In determining whether that presumption has been rebutted, the Court directs us to consider the following factors: "the comprehensiveness of the administrative remedy;" "the administrative agency's view of its own jurisdiction;" "the nature of the alternative judicial cause of action pursued by the plaintiff," that is, whether the "action is wholly or partially dependent upon the statutory scheme which also contains the administrative remedy, or upon the expertise of the administrative agency." 349 Md. at 64-65. Finally, if the administrative remedy and the judicial remedy are concurrent, "the plaintiff at his or her option may pursue the judicial remedy without the necessity of invoking and exhausting the administrative remedy." Id. at 61. In determining whether the administrative remedy is concurrent and not primary, the court observed that it has held an administrative remedy to be concurrent "where the alternative judicial remedy is entirely independent of the statutory scheme containing the administrative remedy, and the expertise of the administrative agency is not particularly relevant to the judicial cause of action." Id. at 65.