In Banquer Realty Co. v. Acting Bldg. Comm'r of Boston, 389 Mass. 565, 451 N.E.2d 422 (1983), plaintiffs sought and obtained three permits for the as of right construction of a concrete plant and appurtenant buildings in Boston. Less than two weeks after the permits were issued, the Acting Building Commissioner first sent a cease and desist order to the plaintiffs and then revoked the permit to build the plant on grounds that it had been issued in error and that a special permit was required. Banquer, 389 Mass. at 566. Within a week of the revocation, the plaintiff brought an action in the Land Court, under G.L. c. 240, 14A, seeking a judicial declaration which would pronounce the use one allowed of right and permit the construction to proceed. Id. The judge in this court, acting under G.L. c. 240, 14A, initially issued a preliminary injunction restraining the city officials from interfering with the construction. Then, on the merits, he declared the use allowed of right and the city's revocation of the building permits void. Id. at 566-567. The defendants, at the trial court and on appeal, challenged the Land Court's jurisdiction to hear the case on grounds that G.L. c. 240, 14A can only be used to test the validity of a bylaw and on grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Id. at 567. As to the defendant's first ground, the Supreme Judicial Court held that "the language of G. L. c. 240, Section 14A, clearly grants the Land Court jurisdiction over two kinds of cases, validity and extent cases." Id. at 570. The Banquer court acknowledged that the general rule is that exhaustion of administrative remedies must occur before parties may resort to the courts, but that "G.L. c. 240, Section 14A, contains language which indicates that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required." Id. at 572. Because G.L. c. 240, 14A says that "the right to file and prosecute . . . a petition [under this section] shall not be affected by the fact that no permit or license to erect structures or to alter, improve or repair existing structures on such land has been applied for . . .," the court concluded that "the Legislature has determined that resort to local zoning procedures is not a necessary prerequisite to obtaining judicial relief." Id. at 573. The court went on to say, "we perceive no reason why the availability of the same judicial relief should be precluded once a plaintiff has applied for a permit but has been denied." Id. Banquer established the availability under G.L. c. 240, 14A of judicial declaratory judgments to resolve, first, whether a given use is, under a municipal zoning law, either the subject of a special permit (conditional use) requirement, or simply allowed without any discretionary approval. The Supreme Judicial Court likened the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It noted that the two doctrines share a common rationale in their attempt to promote proper relations between the courts and administrative agencies. The Court nonetheless held that the statutory language of G. L. c. 240, 14A , directs that judicial relief may be sought and obtained pursuant to that statute, regardless of the existence of administrative review at the municipal level. In so concluding, the Court stated: "we perceive no reason why the availability of the same judicial relief should be precluded once a plaintiff has applied for a permit but has been denied." Id.