In Citgo Petroleum Corp v. Planning Board of Braintree, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 425, 509 N.E.2d 284 (1987), the court interpreted the statutory exclusion of G. L. c. 41, 81L, to find that Citgo was entitled to divide its parcel into two lots, each of which would have located on it a "substantial building" that was in existence when the subdivision control law went into effect in the Town of Braintree. See id. at 426-427. The court found that the statutory language of Section 81L was unambiguous, and permitted a division of Citgo's property without subdivision approval by the Braintree planning board. The court found, but did not rely on the fact, that the preexisting buildings were "substantial" and used for "distinct, independent business operations". See id In finding that the buildings in Citgo were "substantial", the court noted, "a claim that a detached garage or chicken house or woodshed qualifies under Section 81L might present a different case." See id.