Levy v. Reardon stands for the proposition that a master deed cannot validly authorize a developer to deal with land submitted to the provisions of G. L. c. 183A in a manner violative of that chapter. It is settled that land submitted to the condominium form of ownership is subject to recorded interests in such land created prior to recording of the master deed. See Beaconsfield Town House Condominium Trust v. Zussman, 416 Mass. 505, 507-508, 623 N.E.2d 1115 (1993) (master deed recorded immediately after a lease of parking spaces with a term of 155 years was subject to that lease); Commercial Wharf E. Condominium Ass'n v. Waterfront Parking Corp., 407 Mass. 123, 125, 552 N.E.2d 66 (1990) (master deed subject to previously recorded declaration of covenants and easements). Conversely, the law is clear that, once land is submitted to the condominium form of ownership, parties cannot thereafter deal with the land in a manner that does not comply with the provisions of the condominium statute. See Kaplan v. Boudreaux, 410 Mass. 435, 443-444, 573 N.E.2d 495 (1991) (invalidating amendment purporting to give unit owner exclusive rights in a walkway); McElligott v. Lukes, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 61, 64, 674 N.E.2d 1108 (1997) (invalidating lease of garage by unit owner to developer); Schwartzman v. Schoening, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 220, 224, 669 N.E.2d 228 (1996) (invalidating lease of parking space by unit owner to third party).