In People v. Lemmon, 456 Mich. 625, 576 N.W.2d 129, 134 (Mich. 1998), the court addressed a trial court's grant of new trial in a criminal sexual conduct case in which the only testimony was that of two sisters, whom the jury credited but the trial court did not. Lemmon, 576 N.W.2d at 131-33. In dealing with this case, the court examined a similar new trial standard to the standard in this case-involving grant of a new trial in the "interest of justice" based on "the great weight of the evidence," to "prevent a miscarriage of justice." Id. at 133-34. Confronting the issue of a trial judge's ability to disagree with jury credibility determinations, the court noted the "conundrum" between the jury's fundamental role as finder of fact and the implicit credibility questions in weighing evidence after a motion for new trial. Id. at 135. The court described the jury's historic role as requiring "no citation of authority. It is the province of the jury to determine questions of fact and assess the credibility of witnesses." Id. at 134. With the jury's traditional role defined, the court stressed the importance of the jury in our system, observing in particular that "the preservation of the jury by constitutional amendment was designed as a limitation on judicial power." Id. at 135. In attempting to resolve the conundrum, the court aligned itself with jurisdictions that hold "absent exceptional circumstances, issues of witness credibility are for the jury, and the trial court may not substitute its view of the credibility for the constitutionally guaranteed jury determination thereof." Id. at 137. These "exceptional circumstances" required deference to the jury's credibility determinations "unless it can be said that directly contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it was deprived of all probative value or that the jury could not believe it or contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied physical realities." Id. at 138.