In Hildebrand v. Montana State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 147 Mont. 271,. 411 P.2d 744 (1966), the Plaintiff took a test to become a licensed professional engineer, which test was administered by the State Board. He failed but was granted authority to re-take the test. He did not do so but two years after his failure, at a time he had reached 35, he made application for his license under a provision of the statute which provided that one who had reached 35 and who had 12 years of engineering experience could be licensed without the test. The Board refused to grant the license and the Plaintiff petitioned the district court for a writ of mandate. The district court denied the writ and on appeal, Plaintiff argued that the writ of mandate was appropriate because he did not have a fight of appeal and if it was determined that he had a right of appeal, the appeal would be an unconstitutional exercise of administrative power by the judiciary. The Supreme Court, in affirming the district court's decision refusing the writ of mandate, construed the statute in question as giving the district court latitude in devising relief "as to what may seem just and proper". The Supreme Court, in reaching its decision, stated the following: " . . . the Legislature has provided a safety valve in the administrative machinery. The function of the district court, as provided by the statutory right of appeal in the system of administrative decision-making, is to assure that administrative officials do not overstep the guidelines of their authority set down by the Legislature. The court acts as a watchdog and has power to scrutinize and assess the administrative judgment to ascertain if all decisions have been determined properly according to the Board's powers. . The right of appeal is not rendered nugatory because the statute does not specifically prescribe rules to guide the district court in trying such an appeal. 'Awkward, difficult and unsatisfactory as the trial of this case in the district court might, and doubtless would be, we are of the opinion that the learned district judge would be able to devise ways and means not incompatible with the Code for disposing of the case." The court went on to comment: "There is no supplanting of administrative power and authority of an unconstitutional nature by the court in these procedures. There is simply a correction made, if need be, in the exercise of judgment by the administrative body. The statutory guidelines still prevail and must be followed. Though the relief to be granted, or the disposition to be made of the appeal, must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case as it comes before the district judge. Corrective machinery, by its nature, must be given flexible limits, within of course the constitutional and statutory framework that adequate and proper dispositions of each case may result. But that disposition must comport with the guidelines of the statute as determined by the Legislature." It further recognized that the district court did, in fact, possess the right to direct the license to issue. Id, at 278-279.