In Clark v. State, 109 Nev. 426, 851 P.2d 426 (1993), Clark was convicted, pursuant to a jury verdict, of one count of failure to appear, which carried a sentence of not less than one nor more than six years imprisonment. At sentencing the State presented evidence of three prior felony convictions (burglary, forgery and possession of a stolen motor vehicle). The court sentenced Clark as a habitual criminal to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Clark, 109 Nev. at 426-27, 851 P.2d at 426 The Court addressed concerns that the district court had mistakenly believed that once the requisite felonies were proved, the court's authority was limited to deciding only whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment with or without the possibility of parole. 109 Nev. at 427-28, 851 P.2d at 427. Clark explained that the decision to adjudicate an individual as a habitual criminal is not an automatic one because the district court has broad discretion to dismiss a habitual criminal allegation. Id. at 428, 851 P.2d at 427 (citing NRS 207.010(4) (currently codified at NRS 207.010(2)). Clark further concluded that it was not clear from the record whether the trial court had actually exercised its discretion. 109 Nev. at 428-29, 851 P.2d at 427-28. The record indicated that, in imposing the habitual criminal enhancement, the trial court stated that it had "found 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the prior convictions submitted by the District Attorney's Office in this particular matter are legal convictions and are appropriate . . . for enhancement pursuant to NRS 207.010.'" Id. at 428, 851 P.2d at 427. Clark explained that this comment did not "clearly disclose that the court weighed the appropriate factors for and against the habitual criminal enhancement and then, in the exercise of discretion, decided to adjudicate Clark as a habitual criminal." Id. The record also revealed the following comment by the trial court: " NRS 207.010, the operative part of the statute, 'Every person convicted in this state of any crime, of any felony, who has previously been three times convicted . . .' The way I read it, it says, '. . . shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without the possibility of parole.'" Clark, 109 Nev. at 428-29, 851 P.2d at 427-28. Based on these indications from the record this court concluded: It appears likely, or at least strongly possible, that the trial court thought that once three convictions were established, Clark "shall be punished," and that the only discretion allowable was between life with the possibility of parole or life without the possibility of parole. As noted above, however, it was incumbent upon the trial court to weigh properly whether the habitual criminality count should have been dismissed pursuant to the discretion conferred by NRS 207.010(4). Based upon what looks very much like a misunderstanding on the part of the trial judge, we have decided to send this case back for resentencing. Id. at 429, 851 P.2d at 428.