Discriminatory Enforcement New Jersey
In Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985), the United States Supreme Court laid down the general rule governing discriminatory enforcement cases:
"So long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d. 604 (1978).
This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.
Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.
Relying upon Wayte v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253 at 266, 571 A.2d 914 (1990), set forth a two-prong test requiring the "petitioner to show both that . . . the enforcement system has a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose." the defendant's burden is a heavy one. Id.