In Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001 NMSC 34, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, the district court entered a Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint asserting tort claims against the deceased worker's employer on the ground that the Act provides the exclusive remedy for the claims alleged and the employer was, therefore, immune from tort liability. Delgado, 2001 NMSC 34, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148. The plaintiff alleged that the worker "died following an explosion that occurred at a smelting plant after a supervisor ordered the worker to perform a task that, according to the plaintiff, was virtually certain to kill or cause the worker serious bodily injury." Id. The plaintiff also alleged that the employer chose to subject the worker to that risk despite its knowledge that by performing the task the worker "would suffer serious injury or death as a result." Id. The material facts are more fully set out in Delgado and are also succinctly set out in Morales, 2004 NMCA 98., 136 N.M. 280, 97 P.3d 612 The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal in Delgado. Delgado, 2001 NMSC 34. T he Supreme Court reversed. Id. The Court rejected the actual-intent-to-injure test that theretofore had been invoked to escape the Act's immunity. Id. 3-24. The Court held "that when an employer intentionally inflicts or willfully causes a worker to suffer an injury that would otherwise be exclusively compensable under the Act, that employer may not enjoy the benefits of exclusivity, and the injured worker may sue in tort." Id. The Court's underlying goal was to equalize the "bilateral abuse" that can occur when, for example, "an unscrupulous worker might seek recovery from a self-induced injury, knowing that the Act generally awards compensation regardless of fault, and an employer may subject a worker to injury after determining that the economic advantage of the injurious work outweighs the limited economic detriment that the Act will impose upon the employer after the injury occurs." Id. The Supreme Court in Delgado set out the following test: "willfulness renders a worker's injury non-accidental, and therefore outside the scope of the Act, when: (1) the worker or employer engages in an intentional act or omission, without just cause or excuse, that is reasonably expected to result in the injury suffered by the worker; (2) the worker or employer expects the intentional act or omission to result in the injury, or has utterly disregarded the consequences; and (3) the intentional act or omission proximately causes the injury." Id. As to the first prong, the Court stated that "we determine whether a reasonable person would expect the injury suffered by the worker to flow from the intentional act or omission." Id. "The second prong requires an examination of the subjective state of mind of the worker or employer." Id. Explaining this significant aspect of the test in more detail, the Court stated: If the worker or employer decided to engage in the act or omission without ever considering its consequences, this prong is satisfied. If, on the other hand, the worker or employer did consider the consequences of the act or omission, this prong will be satisfied only when the worker or employer expected the injury to occur. It will not be enough, for example, to prove that the worker or employer considered the consequences and negligently failed to expect the worker's injury to be among them. Id. The meaning of an expected injury, as used in the first two prongs of the Delgado test, is clarified by the Court's discussion of the difference between an accidental injury and a virtually certain injury. Id. 3-15, 18. The Court made it clear that an accidental injury is covered by the Act, and includes "an unlooked-for mishap or some untoward event that is not expected or designed." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On the other hand, when "an employer knows his acts will cause certain harm or death to an employee," or when the employer "disregards the consequences" of his acts, then the employer may be sued in tort. Id. 8, 26. Finally, the third prong requires proximate cause. Id. The Court's ultimate justification for rejecting the actual-intent-to-injure test was the fairness in treating workers and employers equally in regard to whether their intentional conduct should deny them benefits and protections of the Act. Id. The Court overruled the Gallegos "actual intent" test (Gallegos v. Chastain) and replaced it with a broader standard. Under Delgado, a worker may pursue remedies outside of the Act if his "employer intentionally inflicts or willfully causes him to suffer an injury." Id. The Court based its decision on the fact that the Act requires workers and employers to be "held to the same standard of conduct." Id. Because a worker may not recover for injuries that are the result of his willfulness, the Court held that an "employer may not enjoy the benefits of exclusivity" if the worker was injured due to the employer's willful act. Id. 1, 24. The Court held that, contrary to legislative intent, the actual-intent-to-harm test improperly favored employers and concluded that a worker may sue an employer in tort when an employer "willfully or intentionally injures a worker." Id. 17. The Court set out a three-part willfulness test to determine when a workplace injury is non-accidental and therefore outside of the scope of the Act. Id. Such a non-accidental injury arises when: (1) the worker or employer engages in an intentional act or omission, without just cause or excuse, that is reasonably expected to result in the injury suffered by the worker; (2) the worker or employer expects the intentional act or omission to result in the injury, or has utterly disregarded the consequences; (3) the intentional act or omission proximately causes the injury. Id.