In State v. Cleve, 1999 NMSC 177, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23, the Supreme Court analyzed the purpose of the game and fish laws and the regulatory scheme implementing those laws. The Court held that the comprehensive nature of the game and fish laws with respect to hunting activity demonstrated a legislative intent to preempt application of the cruelty to animals statute to the hunting of game animals. The Court clarified the applicable test for ascertaining whether two different statutes come within the purview of the general-specific rule. The Court stated that a comparison of the statutory elements of the two laws that address the same subject matter is not the sole relevant factor in determining whether the rule applies. Rather, the focus should be "on whether the Legislature intended that the specific law operate as an exception to the general law and whether the Legislature intended that certain criminal conduct be charged under one special law to the exclusion of other more general laws. This inquiry may include the elements of the crimes, the language of the statutes, the histories and purposes of the statutes, and other relevant indicia of legislative intent." Id. The Court held that NMSA 1978, 30-18-1 (1963, repealed 1999) (amended 2001) (cruelty to animals), one of the many animal-related statutes in Article 18 of the New Mexico Criminal Code (Chapter 30), did not apply to Defendant's conduct in "snaring two deer." Cleve, 1999 NMSC 177. The Supreme Court construed the words "any animal" in Section 30-18-1 to mean "domestic animals and wild animals in captivity," and determined that the conduct was covered under the more specific game and fish laws. See Cleve, 1999 NMSC 17, 4-37. In Cleve, only the cruelty to animals provision in Article 18, namely, Section 30-18-1, was at issue. Cleve, 1999 NMSC 17. The defendant in Cleve was convicted of cruelty to animals under Section 30-18-1 and unlawful hunting under Section 17-2-7(A). Cleve, 1999 NMSC 17. In regard to Section 30-18-1, the question in Cleve was whether "any animal" in that statute meant all animals, including game animals. 1999 NMSC 17. Interpreting Section 30-18-1, the Court read the three subsections of the statute as it then existed to "prohibit behavior that could only apply to domesticated animals or wild animals previously reduced to captivity." Cleve, 1999 NMSC 172. The Court concluded that "the Legislature intended that the phrase 'any animal' denote domesticated animals and wild animals in captivity throughout Section 30-18-1." Cleve, 1999 NMSC 172. The Court also "concluded that the Legislature enacted the entire Article 18 with the exclusive purposes of controlling certain human behavior in relation to domesticated animals and protecting the property rights of the owners of domesticated or previously captured wild animals." Id. Section 30-18-6 was among the statutes in Article 18 specifically referred to by the Court that paved the way for the Court's statement that, "each of these other statutes exclusively concern livestock and other animals possessed by humans." Cleve, 1999 NMSC 173. As to Section 30-18-1, in studying the context surrounding its enactment, the Court concluded that the Legislature intended to exclude wild animals from its protection. Cleve, 1999 NMSC 175. The Court in Cleve then turned to game and fish laws, including the unlawful hunting statute under which the defendant was charged, Section 17-2-7. Cleve, 1999 NMSC 17, 619-34. The Court looked at these laws in the context of the general/specific rule of statutory construction. Id. 6-36. Cleve concluded "that the Legislature did not intend for Section 30-18-1 to apply to hunting activities contemplated by New Mexico's specific laws governing game and fish." Id. The Court held: The overall statutory scheme governing hunting and fishing demonstrates a legislative intent to preempt the application of Section 30-18-1 to game and fish with respect to conduct contemplated by game and fish laws. We believe that the general/specific statute rule therefore provides additional support for our interpretation of Section 30-18-1. Id. The Court further concluded that: Even if the Legislature had intended to protect wild animals in Section 30-18-1, the Legislature, having dealt with the subject of the hunting of game animals more particularly in the game and fish laws, intended to create an exception from the cruelty-to-animals statute for hunting and fishing activity contemplated by game and fish laws. Id. The Court recapitulated the reasoning of the prior decision in State v. Yarborough, 1996 NMSC 68, 6-29, 122 N.M. 596, 930 P.2d 131 (holding that the New Mexico Legislature "intended to preempt involuntary manslaughter when the predicate offense is a misdemeanor contained within the Motor Vehicle Code"). The Cleve Court stated that "an inquiry under the general/specific statute rule should always focus primarily on whether the Legislature intended that the specific law operate as an exception to the general law and whether the Legislature intended that certain criminal conduct be charged under one special law to the exclusion of other more general laws." Cleve, 1999 NMSC 177, 127 N.M. at 250, 980 P.2d at 33.