In Finlay v. Finlay, 240 NY 429, 148 NE 624 1925, Judge Cardozo provided an elegant discussion of the courts' inherent parens patriae authority. In that case, a husband sought to obtain custody by means of an action at law against his wife, from whom he was not seeking a divorce. Judge Cardozo dismissed the action, holding that the court had "no authority for the exercise of that jurisdiction through the medium of an action by one parent against the other" (240 NY at 432), and that the husband must instead proceed by a petition in equity. He went on to explain: "The difference is more than formal. The chancellor in exercising his jurisdiction upon petition does not proceed upon the theory that the petitioner, whether father or mother, has a cause of action against the other or indeed against any one. He acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the child. He is to put himself in the position of a 'wise, affectionate and careful parent' (Queen v. Gyngall, 2 QB 232, 238 (1893)), and make provision for the child accordingly. He may act at the intervention or on the motion of a kinsman, if so the petition comes before him, but equally he may act at the instance of any one else. He is not adjudicating a controversy between adversary parties, to compose their private differences. He is not determining rights 'as between a parent and a child' or as between one parent and another (Queen v. Gyngall, supra). He 'interferes for the protection of infants, qua infants, by virtue of the prerogative which belongs to the Crown as parens patriae' (Matter of Spence, 2 Phillips 247, 248 (1847))." (Finlay at 432.) In Finlay, Judge Cardozo pointedly stated that "equity does not concern itself with such disputes in their relation to the disputants. Its concern is for the child" (240 NY at 434).