In Laura G. v. Peter G., 15 Misc 3d 164, 169, 830 N.Y.S.2d 496 (NY Sup. Ct. Delaware Co. 2007), there was no signed consent, of any type, much less an acknowledged consent, and yet the court concluded that the husband's consent could be proved by other means. Id. at 170. The proof established that the husband not only knew of the procedure, but was a full participant. While holding that the lack of a written consent obviated any statutory finding of parentage, the court, to give effect to "one of the strongest and most persuasive presumptions known to the law," concluded that in the cases in which artificial insemination of a married woman occurs, a rebuttable presumption of spousal consent, disproved only by clear and convincing evidence, exists. Id. at 217. This common law presumption, even in artificial insemination cases, reaffirmed New York's public policy. It eliminated the possibility that parental status could be adversely affected by something as simple a failure of medical personnel to meet statutory procedural requirements. Especially because as one court noted, "medical personnel who conduct AID procedures are not always aware of statutory consent requirements." Id. at 217.