In People v. Grajales (8 NY3d 861, 864 NE2d 596, 832 NYS2d 466 [2007]), the victim of a robbery had initially identified the defendant at the police station from a photographic array as being one of the perpetrators. One week later, the victim saw the defendant on the street and pointed him out to the police, who thereupon arrested him. Thereafter, the People served CPL 710.30 (1) (b) notice upon the defense which referenced the on-the-street point out, but did not mention the prior photographic identification. Having subsequently discovered that the photographic identification had taken place, the defense moved to preclude both the victim's in-court identification as well as the victim's out-of-court identification. That motion was denied by the trial court. The Appellate Division, in affirming the defendant's conviction, found that "under the circumstances of that case, the prosecution had discharged its statutory obligation to provide notice of intent to offer identification testimony at trial", People v. Grajales, 28 AD3d 677, 677, 816 NYS2d 101 (2006 ). The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that "CPL 710.30 (1) (b) . . . only mandates preclusion in the absence of timely notice 'specifying' the pretrial identification evidence 'intended to be offered' at trial" (People v. Grajales, 8 NY3d at 862). The Court reasoned that, since evidence of a witness' pretrial photographic identification is not admissible as evidence-in-chief, "the People could not intend to offer it at trial, and therefore the CPL 710.30 (1) (b) notice in this case was adequate" (id.)