Pachter v. Bernard Hodes Group, Inc

In Pachter v. Bernard Hodes Group, Inc., 10 NY3d 609, 891 N.E.2d 279, 861 N.Y.S.2d 246 (2008), the plaintiff placed advertisements on a commission basis without a written employment agreement. Over the course of nearly ten years, the parties developed a practice where the plaintiff's commission was calculated as a percent of the advertisement's cost, less plaintiff's business expenses. Plaintiff was aware of the practice and never lodged a complaint, until the employer terminated her. The plaintiff in Pachter sued to recover the business expense deductions, arguing that she had "earned" her commissions before the deductions were made, and so the deductions illegally reduced her "earned" wages. The Court of Appeals disagreed and found that "the lack of a specific written contract was not determinative." The Court held that the commissions were "earned" after the deductions because "in the absence of a governing written instrument, when a commission is earned' and becomes a wage' . . . is regulated by the parties' express or implied agreement . . . ." The Court concluded that "the evidence of the parties' extensive course of dealings for more than 11 years and the written monthly compensation statements issued . . . provided ample support for the conclusion that there was an implied contract under which the final computation of the commissions earned by plaintiff depended on first making adjustments . . . ." (Pachter, 10 NY3d at 618.) In Pachter v. Bernard Hodes Group, Inc., the Court, on a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, was "asked to decide when, in the absence of a written agreement between employer and employee, a commission is 'earned' and becomes a 'wage' subject to the prohibition on deductions in Labor Law 193." The Court of Appeals held that "under sections 190 and 193 of the Labor Law . . . the determination of when a commission is earned is governed by the parties' express or implied agreement." Id. at 612. However, the facts leading to the Court's decision are central to holding's application to this matter and must be considered closely. As stated by the Court, Pachter's commission earnings were calculated using a formula. When a client of Hodes agreed to a media buy, Hodes would advance payment to the media company and the client would subsequently reimburse Hodes and pay a fee for Pachter's services. When the client was billed, Pachter received a percentage of the amount billed minus particular charges that are central to the dispute in this case--client receipts were reduced by certain business costs, such as finance charges for late payments, losses attributable to errors in placing advertisements, uncollectible debts and Pachter's travel and entertainment expenses. In addition, she chose to work with an assistant, and half of the assistant's salary was deducted from Pachter's percentage of billings. Each month, Pachter received a commission statement that listed her total billings and the percentage of those billings that represented her gross commission. The expenses attributed to her activities and any advances she had drawn from her commission account were then deducted to reach the net amount of income she had earned for that period. Pachter concedes that she was aware of the charges Hodes subtracted from her gross commissions and acquiesced in the compensation scheme for over a decade. (Pachter, 10 NY3d at 613.) The Court began its analysis by stating that: Plaintiff was paid on a commission basis and a "commission" is considered a "wage" under section 190 (1) of the Labor Law. Section 193 prohibits an employer from making "any deduction from the wages of an employee" unless permitted by law or authorized by the employee for "insurance premiums, pension or health and welfare benefits, contributions to charitable organizations, payments for United States bonds, payments for dues or assessments to a labor organization, and similar payments for the benefit of the employee" (Labor Law 193 [1] [a], [b]). It is undisputed that the charges Hodes made to determine Pachter's final compensation are not within the categories of permissible deductions delineated in section 193. Their legality therefore depends on when Pachter's commission was "earned" and became a "wage" that was subject to the restrictions of section 193. If the adjustments were made before the commissions were earned, section 193 did not prohibit them; but if the charges were subtracted after her commissions were earned, Hodes engaged in impermissible practices under the statute. Hence, the Second Circuit has asked us to determine when Pachter earned her commissions. (Id. at 617.) The Court found that because Article 6 of the Labor Law did not supply any answer to the question of when commissions are earned for purposes of the statute, the common law rule applied. The Court therefore conclude[d] that neither section 193 nor any other provision of article 6 of the Labor Law prevented the parties in this case from structuring the compensation formula so that Pachter's commission would be deemed earned only after specific deductions were taken from her percentage of gross billings. Consequently, we answer the second certified question by stating that, in the absence of a governing written instrument, when a commission is "earned" and becomes a "wage" for purposes of Labor Law article 6 is regulated by the parties' express or implied agreement; or, if no agreement exists, by the default common-law rule that ties the earning of a commission to the employee's production of a ready, willing and able purchaser of the services. (Id. at 618.) The Court concluded that this meant the parties "may provide that the computation of a commission will include certain downward adjustments from gross sales, billings or receivables. In that event, the commission will not be deemed 'earned' or vested until computation of the agreed-upon formula." (Id. at 617-618.) The Second Circuit subsequently held that: Pachter's cause of action must fail, however, because it is undisputed that Pachter knowingly acquiesced over a period of years to the approach used by Hodes when calculating her commissions, conduct that constituted, at the very least, an implied agreement between the parties. As this implied agreement does not violate "section 193 nor any other provision of article 6 of the Labor Law," the deductions in question did not violate that provision. Pachter v. Bernard Hodes Group, Inc., 541 F 3d 461, 464 (2d Cir 2008).