In People v. Biltsted, 151 Misc 2d 620, 627, 574 N.Y.S.2d 256 [Crim Ct, New York County 1991], the court found that the offenses were of the same nature because all eight defendants engaged in a "continuous pattern of criminal conduct within a limited geographic area" (id at 627). The court further noted that all of the defendants' conduct was "prompted by a common motivation of protest or resistance" (id). Further, the court found that the underlying facts of the offenses ("victim, time, place and date") were substantially similar because the offenses occurred in the same four-hour time period, and at the same place (id at 628). The court further observed that the complainants of the each offense could be described as city officials and public property. When described generically, the intended victims of the various offenses were the same or substantially similar (id). Thus, the underlying facts of each offense were the same (id). Because all of the offenses were of the same nature, and the underlying facts of each offense were the same, the court properly found that all of the offenses were part of the same criminal transaction (id at 629). In People v. Biltsted, 150 Misc 2d 872, 574 NYS2d 272 [Crim Ct, NY County 1991]), the trial court rejected the argument that Penal Law 240.10 was facially overbroad, under the constitutional test announced in Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 US 444, 89 S Ct 1827, 23 L Ed 2d 430 [1969]). The Biltsted court observed that in order to avoid unconstitutional overbreadth in statutes which directly affect the rights of assembly and speech, there must be evidence of a clear and present danger of imminent violence or unlawful conduct. (150 Misc 2d 872, 574 NYS2d 272 [1991].) The Biltsted court, noting that the unlawful assembly statute was intended to close a gap between the offenses of riot and inciting to riot (Denzer and McQuillan, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law 240.08 [1967]), held that similar constitutional limits must apply to sanctions against the act of assembly as apply to speech. (150 Misc 2d 872, 574 NYS2d 272 [1991].) That is, before an individual may be charged with unlawful assembly, there must be evidence of "actions that constitute an incitement which is both directed towards and likely to produce imminent violent and tumultuous conduct." (150 Misc 2d at 879-880.) Consequently, the Biltsted court grafted on to Penal Law 240.10 a requirement that the prosecution prove the defendant shared a community of purpose imminently to engage in violent and tumultuous conduct. It follows that presence as part of a group in which some members may be threatening violence and tumult would not suffice to establish a violation of Penal Law 240.10, absent evidence which supports an inference that the accused specifically shared the intent to further that purpose. As the Biltsted court wrote: "It has been held that specially meticulous inquiry into the sufficiency of proof is justified and required because of the real possibility in considering group activity, characteristic of political or social movements, of an unfair imputation of the intent or acts of some participants to all others." (150 Misc 2d at 880.)