In Roldan v. Allstate Ins. Co. (149 AD2d 20, 544 N.Y.S.2d 359 [2d Dept., 1989]; lv. dismissed), involved an underlying automobile accident wherein Thorpe's automobile insurance carrier, Allstate, did not defend and indemnify Thorpe. A default judgment was granted against Thorpe. Subsequently, plaintiff commenced an action against Allstate, as assignee of Allstate's insured (trial court Roldan v. Allstate Ins. Co.). Allstate moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that the statute of limitations expired prior to plaintiff interposing its complaint. Plaintiff's opposed the motion stating, in part, that in the underlying personal injury action (Roland v. Thorpe) three years after the default judgment, Allstate moved to vacate the default judgment on the basis that the Supreme Court lacked personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in Roland v. Thorpe granted the motion, vacated the default judgment and dismissed the underlying personal injury complaint. The Appellate Division reversed and the motion for leave to appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Roldan argued that the causes of action did not accrue until the Court of Appeals denied leave. The Appellate Division, Second Department held that Roldan's causes of action against Allstate based on bad faith and indemnification accrued when the default judgment was entered (id.). Further, the statute of limitations was tolled during the period from which the Supreme Court vacated the default judgment and the Appellate Division reversed that order to reinstate the judgment. The court held that by vacating the default, the insureds causes of action against Allstate were extinguished because the default judgment was a predicate to plaintiff's claims for bad faith and indemnification (see id.).