Should Notices Be Sustained If a Court Finds the Plain Language of the Predicate Note Wholly Sufficient ?
In Berkeley Assocs. Co. v. Camlakides (173 AD2d 193, 199 [1st Dept], affd on mem below 78 NY2d 1098 ), Justice Sullivan, in dissent in the Appellate Division, argued that notices should be sustained without requiring a pedantic level of detail.
As stated by Justice Sullivan (at 199):
"To require an elaboration of the facts supporting the landlord's statement of ultimate fact ... is to return to the discarded and discredited code pleading requirements ... and to ensnare the courts in endless litigation over the adequacy of the notice."
Justice Sullivan's position in that case was rejected solely because the Appellate Division majority viewed itself as "constrained by the plain language of the Rent Stabilization Code" (173 AD2d, at 195), the statute which controlled in that case but which is not at all at issue in the present commercial proceeding.
In the absence of such a constraint, this court, applying Justice Sullivan's analysis, finds the plain language of the predicate notice wholly sufficient, particularly in a commercial context. (See, NL Indus. v. PaineWebber Inc., 720 F Supp 293, 299-301 [SD NY 1989]; PacifiCorp Capital v. Tano, Inc., 877 F Supp 180, 185 [SD NY 1995]; SVS, Inc. v. Rabbit Ears Prods., 1992 WL 91183, [SD NY, Dec. 12, 1991, Haight, J.].)