Not Paying Suspended License Restoration Fee Consequences

In Ennis v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 612, 184 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. 1971), the North Carolina Supreme Court had to determine whether failure to pay a $ 10 restoration fee extended the period of revocation. The relevant North Carolina Statute read, "Any person whose license to operate a motor vehicle in this State has been suspended, canceled or revoked pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall pay a restoration fee of ten dollars to the Department prior to the issuance to such person of a new license or the restoration of such license, such restoration fee shall be paid to the Department . . . ." See, 184 S.E.2d at 248. The Court held that failure to pay the fee did not extend the period of revocation. The statute "does not expressly extend the period of a suspension, cancellation or revocation. On its face, it merely provides for the payment of a fee for an administrative act by the Department." Id.; See also: Frink v. Indiana, 568 N.E.2d 535, 538 (Ind. 1991) (finding the language "no person whose operating privileges have been suspended . . . shall have those privileges restored until a reinstatement fee has been paid," did not extend the initial period of suspension until the fee was paid); State v. Resendiz-Fortanel, 131 Idaho 488, 959 P.2d 845, 848 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998) (agreeing with the conclusion that a period of suspension or revocation is not extended by a driver's failure to apply for or pay fees associated with the reinstatement, but holding the license remains suspended, by the express terms of the Idaho statute, for failure to give proof of financial responsibility); People v. Martinez, 184 Ill. 2d 547, 705 N.E.2d 65, 67, 235 Ill. Dec. 452 (Ill. 1998) (finding that after revision, the language that "Full driving privileges may not be restored until all applicable fees . . . have been paid to the Secretary of State," creates a prerequisite to ending suspension).