R.C. 2945.71 Interpretation
In State v. Gibson (1992), 75 Ohio App.3d 388, 599 N.E.2d 438, the Court held that a defendant who violated his bond and failed to appear for scheduling conference hearings set by the court waived his "'right to assert the provisions of R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73 for that period of time which elapsed from his initial arrest to the date he was subsequently rearrested.'" Id. at 392, quoting State v. Bauer (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 83, 85, 399 N.E.2d 555 (alterations in original).
The defendant, Gibson, was originally arrested in September 1990 for a fourth degree felony charge, and was subsequently released on a recognizance bond.
Gibson's trial was initially scheduled for January 1991, but was rescheduled for March 1991 due to motions filed by the defendant.
Shortly before the March 1991 trial, Gibson's counsel withdrew, new counsel was appointed, and a scheduling conference was scheduled for the beginning of April 1991.
Gibson failed to appear at the scheduling conference.
The trial court rescheduled the scheduling conference for the following week, but Gibson again failed to appear.
Consequently, the trial court revoked Gibson's bond and issued a capias writ for his arrest.
Gibson was rearrested at the end of May 1991, and his trial was ultimately scheduled for the end of August 1991.
Prior to trial, Gibson moved for dismissal of his case based on alleged violations of his right to speedy trial, which the trial court denied.
Subsequently, Gibson pled no contest and was found guilty and sentenced accordingly.
On appeal to this Court, we held that Gibson's speedy trial time did not begin to run until the date of his rearrest in May 1991, rather than the date of his initial September 1990 arrest.
In doing so, we relied on the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Bauer, which held that a defendant who failed to appear for trial waived the benefits of the speedy trial statutes for the period of time between his initial arrest and his subsequent rearrest because "through his own design he chose to shun this right and impede the prompt administration of this cause." Bauer, 61 Ohio St.2d at 84.
Additionally, the Bauer Court rejected the defendant's assertion that his failure to appear at trial merely tolled the running of the speedy trial statute from the initial trial date to his rearrest, finding that argument to be "unworkable and inconsistent with the efficient administration of justice." Id. at 85.
Instead, the Court recalculated the defendant's speedy trial time from the date of his rearrest to his trial date, taking into consideration the triple-count provision under R.C. 2945.71(E), and concluding that the defendant's speedy trial rights had not been violated.