Waiving the Right to a Speedy Trial As to An Initial Charge
In State v. Adams (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 69, 538 N.E.2d 1025, the defendant was charged with a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(3) in the original indictment, then charged with a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) in the superseding indictment.
The Adams Court acknowledged that, "when an accused waives the right to a speedy trial as to an initial charge, this waiver is not applicable to additional charges arising from the same set of circumstances that are brought subsequent to the execution of the waiver." Id. at syllabus, 43 Ohio St. 3d 67, 538 N.E.2d 1025.
The state argued that the charges in the original indictment and the superseding indictment were substantially similar, in that they were derived from the same statute and generally involved the same conduct. However, Adams successfully argued that his waiver, as applied to the subsequent charges, was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made because the subsequent charges were "distinct" from the original charges and could have, "involved different defenses at the time of trial." Id. at 69, 538 N.E.2d 1025.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the application of Adams' waiver to the charges in the superseding indictment violated his due process rights because he did not know, "the exact nature of the crime he was charged with," when he executed the waiver. Id. at 70, 538 N.E.2d 1025.