In Duncan v. City of Nichols Hills, 1996 OK 16, 913 P.2d 1303, the plaintiff-employee filed a claim with the OHRC alleging that he had been wrongfully terminated by his employer, the City of Nichols Hills, because of his handicap. Dissatisfied with the speed of OHRC's investigation, the employee filed a state employment discrimination claim against the city in Oklahoma County District Court. The city moved to dismiss, asserting that the employee had failed to give notice and file his suit within the time period set forth in 157 of the GTCA. The employee responded that his claim was essentially a civil rights claim for employment discrimination subject to the two-year limitations period set forth in 25 O.S.1991 1901. The trial court dismissed the claim, finding that it was a tort as defined by the GTCA and was, therefore, subject to the GTCA's notice and limitations periods. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found an "irreconcilable conflict" between the notice provisions of the GTCA and the limitations period set forth in 25 O.S.1991 1901. The Court noted that these statutes gave employees of state entities a shorter period to file a discrimination claim than employees of private entities, and a shorter period to file state discrimination claims than if they had filed similar federal discrimination claims. The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that this difference in treatment of similarly situated victims of discrimination was contrary to the Oklahoma Legislature's intent in enacting the OADA, as shown by 25 O.S.1991 1302, which prohibited an employer's discrimination and discharge of an employee because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and handicap, and by 1101(a) which stated the general goal of the OADA, to wit: (a) The general purposes of this act are to provide for execution within the state of the policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to make uniform the law of those states which enact this act, and to provide rights and remedies substantially equivalent to those granted under the federal Fair Housing Law. The Duncan Court concluded: Because we find the remedial objectives of 1901 analogous to the objectives of the federal Civil Rights provisions, we hold that the notice provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims Act are preempted with respect to claims brought under 25 O.S. 1991 1901. We also find support for this conclusion from the plain language of the Act and 1901 and by applying the general rule for resolving conflicts among two competing statutory provisions i.e., a specific statute controls and acts as an exception to a statute of general applicability. As we previously noted, the Governmental Tort Claims Act is intended to provide the exclusive remedy for torts committed by the state or a political subdivision. Had Duncan asserted a cause of action in tort, or a parallel action as in Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72, 833 P2d 1218, the plain language of the Act requires compliance with the notice provisions of the Act. However, Duncan brought his claim pursuant to a state statute specifically enacted to provide a remedy for persons discriminated against by reason of handicap. This statute allows a claimant to file a claim in district court within two (2) years after filing a complaint with the OHRC. See 25 O.S. 1991 1901(E). In addition, Section 1901 authorizes a private cause of action against any person who has allegedly discriminated against the charging party. And as we have already indicated, the legislature has included within the definition of person the state or a governmental entity. See 25 O.S. 1991 1201(5).