In York v. York, 1953 OK 336, 270 P.2d 656, 658 , the supreme court said, "where there is no note or memorandum of the agreement in writing, performance by the parties seeking its specific performance will take the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds . . . but such performance must be clearly referable to the contract and must consist of services whose character is exceptional and extraordinary and whose value cannot be fairly estimated by any pecuniary standard, or it must appear that the promisee's 'whole course of life was changed' by his performance." The court in York further observed that: "The acts of the parties and the equities arising therefrom are the real basis of equitable relief and for their acts to be 'referable' to their contract, they must point clearly and exclusively to the existence of that particular contract or one of the same general tenor." Id. at P9, 270 P.2d at 659 . The court further explained, "Conduct which can be reasonably explained without reference to such an oral contract does not usually constitute the 'performance' required. 'What is done must itself supply the key to what is promised.'" Id. The court concluded by saying, "it should appear with reasonable certainty that the services would not have been performed but for the oral agreement." Id. In the York case, the plaintiff was the nephew of the deceased. Over a period of twenty years, plaintiff and his uncle lived in the same household, although not always on the farm owned by the uncle. From September of 1947 to January 1952, plaintiff, his wife and uncle lived on the uncle's farm. During this time, plaintiff and his wife took care of the farm and attended to some of uncle's needs. However, the evidence also reflected that plaintiff paid his uncle the customary farm rent crop, and plaintiff and his wife did not attend to all of uncle's needs and affairs. The court noted that uncle purchased groceries, sometimes paid to have laundry done outside the home, and was "probably more capable than plaintiff" with respect to paying bills and taxes, and looking after business matters entailing no heavy manual labor. Without diminishing the importance or benefit of the services provided by plaintiff to his uncle, the court concluded "plaintiff was little more than a combination tenant, confidant, errand boy and/or chauffeur [and] each did favors for the other that were reciprocated, not because of any feeling of contractual obligation, but from motives of mutual love, affection and helpfulness." Id. The court further stated that, "looking at the personal services furnished his uncle by the plaintiff and his wife, against the background of their previous and continued relationship and association, it is difficult if not impossible to find anything the latter did for the uncle after he made the promise attributed to him that they would not have done otherwise." Id.