In Annenberg v. Commonwealth, 562 Pa. 581, 757 A.2d 338 (2000), a personal property tax imposed on certain shares of stock was at issue. The net effect of the "stock clause" was that the only stock that an owner was liable to pay tax on was stock in foreign corporations that did no business in Pennsylvania. 562 Pa. at 586 n.4. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that the tax was facially discriminatory and that the stock clause was not a valid compensatory tax. Id. at 594. Regarding the three-pronged analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that none of the prongs were met. Id. at 589-94. Under the first prong, "the Counties" argued that "the legislature crafted the stock clause as part of a comprehensive taxing scheme in order to compensate for the taxes exacted by the capital stock and franchise taxes." Id. at 590. The capital stock tax applied to companies organized under the law of Pennsylvania, and the franchise tax was owed by entities organized in any jurisdiction other than Pennsylvania that also did business in and were liable to taxation in Pennsylvania. Id. at 586 n.4. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had found that the tax was facially discriminatory and remanded the case to the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County for a hearing and an interim report to be issued on whether the stock clause was a compensatory tax. 562 Pa. at 585. At the hearing, the Annenbergs and boards of numerous Pennsylvania counties participated, which is why the Pennsylvania Supreme Court referred to "the Counties." Id. at 587. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the Counties' argument for two reasons. First, the stock clause was not part of a comprehensive scheme. Id. at 590. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court traced the development of the Commonwealth's first personal property tax and its first capital stock tax, which dated from 1831 and 1840, respectively. Id. The Court concluded that the "taxes were not an integrated, comprehensive system of taxation." Id. at 591. Rather, they developed independent of each other. Id. The evidence thus did not support the contention that the legislature had enacted the taxes as part of an interconnected scheme. Id. Second, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the Counties did not establish that the stock clause tax "'is fairly related to the services provided by the State which benefit interstate commerce.'" Id. The Court wrote: Some of the Counties attempted to show that they provided services which benefited interstate commerce by showing that they provided services which corporations not doing business in Pennsylvania arguably utilized. However, none of the Counties established to what extent these services were provided to or utilized by corporations not doing business in Pennsylvania. Thus, we are unable to determine whether the tax imposed by the stock clause "is fairly related to the services" provided by the Counties. Annenberg, 757 A.2d at 344 When considering the second prong, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that the Counties were required to "establish that the tax imposed by the facially discriminatory stock clause roughly approximates, but does not exceed, the amount of the tax burden which the capital stock tax and the franchise tax impose." Id. at 592. The Counties had presented the testimony of an expert witness who asserted that most of the monies collected through the capital stock and franchise taxes went to the general fund, which was distributed on a state-wide basis. Annenberg, 562 Pa. at 592. The remaining amount went to the Lottery Fund and the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Fund. Id. During one of the years in question, approximately 40% of the general fund was distributed to the local governments. Id. The expert witness compared this figure to the rate levied by the personal property tax and "concluded that the personal property tax roughly approximates, but does not exceed, the amount of the tax burden which the capital stock tax and the franchise tax impose." Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not persuaded by the expert witness. First, the Court noted that the expert failed to recognize "that the money distributed from the general fund to local governments is distributed not only to counties, which may collect the personal property tax, but also to municipalities, townships and school districts, which in general may not collect the personal property tax." Id. at 592 It was thus impossible to determine how much of that 40% "was distributed to the Counties and thus could possibly be seen as a counterpart to the allegedly compensatory personal property tax, and which portion was distributed to local entities which cannot collect the personal property tax and thus could in no fashion be seen as a counterpart to the personal property tax." Id. at 592-93. Second, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found a problem with the expert witness's calculations because not all the Counties collected the personal property tax. Id. at 593. As a result, in order to give an accurate representation of whether the taxes collected by the personal property tax are in parity with the portion of the capital stock and franchise taxes the counties receive from the general fund, the witness would have had to calculate how much the counties which collect the personal property tax receive from the general fund, and exclude from his calculations how much the general fund distributes to the counties which do not collect the personal property tax. Id. Upon considering the third prong, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the taxes were not substantially equivalent, that is, that they could not be considered proxies for each other. Id. This was because the personal property tax was based on the value of the shares on one day, but the capital stock and franchise taxes were determined "by measuring economic flow." Id. Further, the taxes were "imposed and utilized by different levels of government." Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained: "The personal property tax is imposed at the county level and is utilized for county purposes. The capital stock and franchise taxes, on the other hand, are imposed at the state level and are utilized for state purposes." Id. at 593-94. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded, id. at 594: The Counties have failed to carry their burden of establishing that the stock clause of the personal property tax is a compensatory tax. We are thus compelled to find that the portion of the stock clause which excludes from the personal property tax stock held in companies which are subject to the capital stock and franchise taxes is unconstitutional as it violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 594.