In Bowman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 930 A.2d 599 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), while on parole by the Board, the parolee was arrested on a state firearms charge. The state charges were withdrawn in order to facilitate a federal prosecution, and on the same day, the parolee was moved to a federal detention center where he was arrested on a new federal firearms charge. He did not post bail, and he was immediately returned to a state correctional institution. Thereafter, the parolee pled guilty to federal firearms charge, and he was sentenced later to federal prison. Upon his release and his return to state prison, the Board issued a recalculation order. The Board order did not credit the parolee's original state sentence with the time during which he was confined on a new federal charge on which he had not posted bail. On appeal, the parolee asserted the Board erred in failing to credit this time toward his original state sentence. After a thorough review of relevant case law beginning with our Supreme Court's seminal decision in Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 488 Pa. 397, 412 A.2d 568 (1980), and including more recent decisions in McCray v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 582 Pa. 440, 872 A.2d 1127 (2005), Armbruster v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 919 A.2d 348 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), Melhorn v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 883 A.2d 1123 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), rev'd per curiam, 589 Pa. 250, 908 A.2d 266 (2006), The Court rejected this assertion. More specifically, the Court explained: Unlike Pennsylvania Courts of Common Pleas, United States District Courts do not have the power to calculate credit for time spent in custody. Instead, it appears that it is the Attorney General, through the BOP, that possesses the sole authority to make credit determinations pursuant to 18 U.S.C.S. 3585(b). See United States v. Whaley, 148 F.3d 205 (2nd Cir. 1998) (citing United States v, Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992)) (noting that although prisoners may seek judicial review of the BOP's sentencing determinations after exhausting their administrative remedies, the district court is without jurisdiction to compute sentencing credit if a prisoner does not challenge his sentence and has not sought administrative review); see also United States v. Pardue, 363 F.3d 695 (8th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging that administrative procedures exist with the BOP to review the BOP's failure to credit time the appellant has served and that, once administrative remedies are exhausted, prisoners may then seek judicial review of any jail-time credit determination by filing a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.S. 2241). Based on our review of the record, there is no indication that the parolee sought sentencing credit on his new federal sentence through the proper administrative channels. Consequently, this case is similar to Armbruster, Melhorn and McCray in that the parolee was not given credit on his new sentence for the time spent in custody but now seeks to have it applied to his original sentence. As in Armbruster the remedy is not through the Board but was, instead, through the entity with the power to make credit determinations, in this case the BOP. Simply put, the parolee's oversight in failing to seek credit on his new federal sentence for his time in custody cannot and should not be rewarded. Accordingly, we conclude that the parolee's argument is without merit. (Bowman, 930 A.2d at 605.)