Manifestly Unreasonable Doctrine
In City of Washington v. Department of Police of the City of Washington, 436 Pa. 168, 259 A.2d 437 (1969), the Court determined that despite Act 111's prohibition on appeals of arbitration awards, then-existing Supreme Court Rule 68A 1/2 provided narrow certiorari review where a legislative act prohibited appeals.
Thereafter, in Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers Ass'n, 698 A.2d 688 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (Smith) and Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers Ass'n, 698 A.2d 686 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (Johnson), the PSP first invited us to expand narrow certiorari to include review under the "manifestly unreasonable" doctrine.
This doctrine held it was unreasonable to conclude a public employer bargained away its absolute responsibility to ensure the integrity of its agency where an employee engaged in outrageous conduct, which may or may not have been criminal in nature, toward a specific group of citizens.
Thus, an arbitrator had to uphold the employer's disciplinary action once a finding of just cause was made. Smith, 698 A.2d at 687 n.2.
However, in State System of Higher Education (Cheyney University) v. State College University Professional Ass'n (PSEA-NEA), 560 Pa. 135, 743 A.2d 405 (1999), the Supreme Court rejected the "manifestly unreasonable" standard of the "essence" test.