Section 426 of the Workers' Compensation Act
In Cudo v. Hallstead Foundry, Inc., 517 Pa. 553, 557, 539 A.2d 792, 794 (1988), our Supreme Court stated, to the extent justice so requires, "the Board has broad powers to grant a rehearing."
Cudo involved a remand pursuant to Section 426 of the Workers' Compensation Act, 77 P.S. 871, which governs remands by the Board after the Board decision has been rendered, and provides a rehearing may be granted "upon cause shown."
Although Cudo involved a rehearing under Section 426 after the Board rendered a decision, in Joseph v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Delphi Co.), 522 Pa. 154, 159, 560 A.2d 755, 757 (1989), the Supreme Court held that where the Board had not yet rendered a decision "the power to remand in the interest of efficient and fair resolution of claims is even more compelling than in cases where a decision has previously been rendered."
The Court determined it would have been unjust for the Board to proceed with a review of a WCJ decision after having been informed of a notable error.
The Act gives the Board broad power to grant a remand or rehearing "when justice requires."
In addition, in Puhl v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Sharon Steel Corp.), 724 A.2d 997, 1000 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), "the Court recognized that our courts have frequently analyzed remand issues under the same standards used in Section 426 rehearing cases."