In Qualitex, Inc. v. Coventry Realty Corp., 557 A.2d 850, 852 (R.I. 1989) the Supreme Court acknowledged that other jurisdictions "have consistently found heating, refrigeration, and electrical systems to be improvements to real property." 557 A.2d at 852. In that case, the Court discussed whether defendant ITT Grinnell was a manufacturer within the class of persons protected by 9-1-29. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that "Grinnell Corporation, a predecessor in interest to ITT Grinnell, designed, manufactured, sold and installed the allegedly defective sprinkler unit." Qualitex, 557 A.2d at 851. In discussing the term "manufacturer," the Supreme Court observed that 9-1-29 "does not expressly exclude manufacturers or any particular class from its operation. The language of the statute was broadly written, and it is clear that the Legislature intended a broad application. Although terms must be given their plain and ordinary meaning, if a mechanical application of a statutory definition . . . defeats legislative intent, this court will look beyond mere semantics and give effect to the purpose of the act. In this context the statute must be read to include manufacturers. Manufacturers, just like architects, engineers, contractors, and subcontractors, need protection from individuals whose negligence in maintaining an improvement to real property may cause liability." Qualitex, 557 A.2d at 853. The Supreme Court then observed that not only did ITT Grinnell qualify as a manufacturer for purposes of 9-1-29, but that because it had designed, manufactured, inspected and installed the allegedly defective product, it also qualified as a "material man" under the Act. See id. ("As manufacturer, installer, and supplier, ITT Grinnell, we find, is a material man for purposes of 9-1-29.") (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court defined the term material man "as one who 'furnishes materials or supplies used in the construction or repair of a building or structure.'"