In State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265 (Tenn. 1992), the defendant was arrested after he escaped from a Department of Correction work detail. At the time of his arrest, he was also a suspect in a homicide committed on the day of his escape. Upon being arrested, the defendant was handcuffed and placed in the front seat of a squad car. A detective read his Miranda rights. When the detective asked the defendant whether, having heard his rights, he wished to make a statement, the defendant replied either, "I don't have anything to say right now," or, "I don't have anything to say." The detective then terminated his interrogation of the defendant. Subsequently, however, another officer, hoping to gain information related to the homicide in which the defendant was a suspect, asked the defendant whether he would mind riding with him to the scene of his escape. The defendant accepted the ride and two officers took him on a 30- to 45-minute drive, retracing his escape route. Near a hotel, the officers stopped the car and asked the defendant whether he had stolen anything from a car in the parking lot. The defendant admitted that he had and one of the officers informed him that the items had been found at the homicide scene. The two officers then noted an emotional change in the defendant. Upon returning to the station, the defendant was again read his Miranda rights and, after signing a written waiver of his rights, he gave a recorded statement wherein he confessed to the homicide. The trial court found that the defendant's right to remain silent had not been "scrupulously honored" and suppressed both the statements made by the defendant in the car and the recorded confession. On appeal, the Court ultimately held that the trial court had correctly excluded the statements and confession: To fully honor an accused's self-incrimination rights, . . . "once warnings have been given, . . . if the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At that point, he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege." The facts presented in this appeal clearly demonstrate that the defendant's right to cut off questioning by invocation of his right to remain silent was not "scrupulously honored." Thirty minutes after responding to Miranda warnings with "I don't have anything to say," he was taken on a 30 to 45-minute drive and questioned while retracing the route of his escape. This clearly constituted an impermissible resumption of in-custodial interrogation, which caused the admissions made by Crump during the drive to be inadmissible. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the police failure to scrupulously honor the defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent amounted to a violation of the defendant's state and federal constitutional rights. . . . Once an individual invokes his right to remain silent and the police fail to honor that invocation by continuing to interrogate him, that violation, by definition, is of constitutional magnitude. Although the officers did administer Miranda warnings before obtaining the taped confession, there were no intervening circumstances. In addition, the temporal proximity of the police misconduct to the confession was too short to purge the confession of the taint of the prior constitutional violation. Therefore, we find that the taped confession is inadmissible "fruit of the poisonous tree." (834 S.W.2d at 269-70, 272.) Upon concluding that the defendant's confession was involuntary, the Court reversed the conviction and granted a new trial.