In State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101 (Tenn. 1998) the defendant's sister had been involved in a knife fight with Glorissa Buchanan. At the juvenile hearing held with regard to the knife fight, the victim testified that after the defendant's sister was stabbed, the defendant struck Ms. Buchanan twice with a gun. Several days after the juvenile hearing, the defendant killed the victim. At the defendant's subsequent trial, Ms. Buchanan's mother, Gloria Buchanan, testified as to the victim's statements at that juvenile hearing. The Tennessee Supreme court ruled that Gloria Buchanan's testimony was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but instead was offered for the purpose of showing the "bad blood" between the parties and their families. Id. at 108. However, in Williams, the truth of the victim's statement at the juvenile hearing was irrelevant. In fact, the Court pointed out that if the victim's statement was false it would have increased the probative value of the evidence because it would have further shown the "bad blood" between the parties. Id. It was the fact that the victim had testified adversely to the defendant, not the content of that testimony, that was relevant. In finding the failure to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter harmless, the supreme court stated: "The trial court's erroneous failure to charge voluntary manslaughter is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury's verdict of guilt on the greater offense of first degree murder and its disinclination to consider the lesser included offense of second degree murder clearly demonstrates that it certainly would not have returned a verdict on voluntary manslaughter." Id. The Court held that although the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of first degree murder, the error was harmless because the jury was instructed on the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and still convicted the defendant of first degree murder. Id. at 106. In State v. Williams, The trial court charged the jury with the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder and reckless homicide. The court of criminal appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on the basis it was reversible error for the trial court to not charge voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense. The supreme court agreed that it was error to not charge voluntary manslaughter, but held that it was harmless, and not reversible error. Id. at 106. Specifically, the supreme court stated: "Accordingly, we conclude that a trial court's erroneous failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter is subject to harmless error analysis. Reversal is required if the error affirmatively appears to have affected the result of the trial on the merits, or in other words, reversal is required if the error more probably than not affected the judgment to the defendant's prejudice. See, e.g., State v. Hamm, 611 S.W.2d 826 (Tenn. 1981) (applying harmless error analysis and concluding that the trial court's failure to instruct upon the lesser offense constituted prejudicial error)." (977 S.W.2d at 105.) In State v. Williams, the supreme court also held: ". . . by finding the defendant guilty of the highest offense to the exclusion of the immediately lesser offense, second degree murder, the jury necessarily rejected all other lesser offenses, included voluntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the trial court's erroneous failure to charge voluntary manslaughter is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury's verdict of guilt on the greater offense of first degree murder and its disinclination to consider the lesser-included offense of second degree murder clearly demonstrates that it certainly would not have returned a verdict on voluntary manslaughter." In State v. Williams, the majority opinion stated, as quoted above, that reversal was required when the trial court erroneously failed to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, ". . . if the error affirmatively appears to have affected the result of the trial on the merits, or in other words, reversal is required if the error more probably than not affected the judgment to the defendant's prejudice." Williams, 977 S.W.2d at 105. However, as also noted above, the majority opinion held that the trial court's erroneous failure to charge the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 977 S.W.2d at 106. In short, the defendant was charged with and convicted of first degree premeditated murder. See id. at 102. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense, but it did instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and reckless homicide. See id. at 102, 104. The trial court also instructed the jury as follows: You must first determine if the defendant is guilty of the offense of murder in the first degree as charged in the indictment. If you agree that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder in the first degree, you may stop your discussions and return your verdict. If you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt of murder in the first degree, then your verdict must be not guilty as to this offense, and then you shall proceed to determine his guilt or innocence of the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree. Id. at 106.