In Alameda v. State, 181 S.W.3d 772, 774 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2005), Deborah H., the parent of J.H., recorded conversations between J.H. and Alameda because she suspected the two were engaging in inappropriate conduct. The recordings suggested Alameda and J.H. were involved in a sexual relationship. Alameda, 181 S.W.3d at 774-75. Alameda was charged with aggravated sexual assault of a child. Id. at 775. At trial, Alameda filed a motion to suppress the recordings because "section 16.02 of the penal code makes it an offense to intentionally intercept wire communications when no consent has been given." Id. The trial court denied Alameda's motion. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Alameda's motion. In doing so, the court of appeals adopted the vicarious consent doctrine, stating: "we agree with the federal and state courts that have adopted the vicarious consent doctrine. We hereby adopt the standard set forth in Pollock, and hold that as long as a parent has a good faith, objectively reasonable basis for believing that the taping of telephone conversations is in the best interest of the parent's minor child, the parent may vicariously consent to the recording on behalf of the child." Id. at 778.