In Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (plurality op.), the trial court told prospective jurors that: (1) the trial delay was due to the defendant's attempt at making a plea bargain with the State and the defendant's prolonging the negotiations; (2) the trial court would prefer the defendant to plead guilty, and; (3) there were reasons an innocent defendant might not testify, but, even knowing she was guilty, defense counsel might put Sister Theresa on the stand because nobody would believe she would lie. Id. at 130. Although the defendant in Blue did not object to the comments at trial, a plurality of the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the intermediate appellate court's holding that the error was waived. The judges voting to reverse, however, disagreed in their rationale for the reversal. Four judges concluded the trial court's comments "tainted appellant's presumption of innocence in front of the venire" and were fundamental error of constitutional dimension. See id. at 132 (opinion of Johnson, J.). The Court held that the trial court's comments to the venire tainted the presumption of innocence by revealing that the defendant had seriously considered entering into a plea agreement and that the trial court was frustrated with the time the defendant took in his decision and would have preferred that the defendant have pleaded guilty. Id. at 130, 132. The Blue court held that the defendant need not have objected to such comments, that they amounted to fundamental error of constitutional dimension. Id. at 132. Notably, the Blue court also emphasized that the comments came from the bench, that it was the trial court imparting this information to the venire: "In this case, the judge's comments imparted information to the venire that tainted the presumption of innocence. A juror who knows at the outset that the defendant seriously considered entering into a plea agreement no longer begins with a presumption that the defendant is innocent. A juror who hears the judge say that he would have preferred that the defendant plead guilty might assume that the judge knows something about the guilt of the defendant that the juror does not. Surely, no trial judge would want an innocent man to plead guilty, no matter how much delay and expense he might be causing." Id. The Court inexplicably told the venire panel that the defendant had received a plea offer and was contemplating whether to accept it and plead guilty. Blue, 41 S.W.3d at 130. The trial court stated that he would "prefer" that the defendant plead, implying that the plea should be one of guilty. Id. Then the trial judge attempted to explain why a defendant, though innocent, might decide to not testify. Id. In his explanation, he included an illustrative example of an attorney, putting a guilty "Sister Teresa" on the stand because she looks so innocent and "nobody thinks she would tell a lie." Id. Defendant Blue did not object to any of these statements. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals, by a plurality, found that the trial judge's comments tainted the presumption of innocence of the defendant, and that such comment was fundamental error of constitutional dimension not requiring objection at trial. Blue, 41 S.W.3d at 129, 132. Two judges concurred, finding that the judge's comments violated the right to an impartial judge or an impartial tribunal. Id. at 135. The judge also expressed his opinion that, "he would have preferred that the defendant plead guilty." Id. These specific comments "'vitiated the presumption of innocence' before the venire, adversely affecting appellant's right to a fair trial," and therefore the comments "were fundamental error of constitutional dimension and required no objection." Id. at 132. In Blue v. State, the trial court apologized to the jury for the delay by telling them that the defendant was still trying to decide whether to take a plea bargain. See id. at 130. Further, the trial court told the jury his personal preference was the defendant plead guilty. See id. Lastly, the trial court informed the jury, "We were all trying to work toward that and save you time and cost of time." See id. Ultimately, a plurality of the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the actions of the trial court amounted to fundamental error and there need not be an objection at trial to gain appellate review of the issue. See id. at 134. A plurality of the Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned: "A juror who knows at the outset that the defendant seriously considered entering into a plea agreement no longer begins with a presumption that the defendant is innocent." Id. at 132. Further, "a juror who hears the judge say that he would have preferred that the defendant plead guilty might assume that the judge knows something about the guilt of the defendant that the juror does not." Id. Accordingly, the plurality concluded that "the comments of the trial judge, which tainted appellant's presumption of innocence in front of the venire, were fundamental error of constitutional dimension and required no objection." Id.The Court Criminal Appeals held that an appellant need not always object to voir dire statements to preserve error. In that case, the trial court apologized to the venire panel for a long delay, told them that the delay was caused by the defendant's indecision about whether to take a plea bargain, and noted that it would have preferred the defendant to plead guilty. Blue, 41 S.W.3d at 130. Because these comments compromised the defendant's presumption of innocence, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that no objection was necessary to preserve the issue for appellate review. Blue, 41 S.W.3d at 132-33.A plurality of the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a trial court's comments during voir dire that "tainted the defendant's presumption of innocence in front of the venire, were fundamental error of constitutional dimension and required no objection." Id. at 132. The trial court apologized to the venire for its long wait, explained that the delay had occurred because the defendant was indecisive on whether to accept a plea bargain, and expressed its preference that the defendant plead guilty. Id. at 130. In Blue, the trial court expressed its view regarding appellant's guilt or decision to go to trial.