In Bowie Mem'l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002), the plaintiff alleged that a physician's assistant misread or misplaced an x-ray and, therefore, did not discover that the plaintiff had fractured her foot. 79 S.W.3d at 50. Approximately one month later, the plaintiff's orthopedic surgeon discovered the fracture. Id. The plaintiff served on the defendant health care provider the report of an expert, who stated that had the x-ray been properly read, the plaintiff "would have had the possibility of a better outcome." Id. at 51. The Texas Supreme Court, after recognizing that an expert in his report need not use any particular phrase, held that the trial court could have reasonably determined that the report did not represent a good-faith effort to summarize the causal relationship. Id. at 53. The supreme court noted that the expert in his report simply opined that the plaintiff had the "possibility of a better outcome," and did not sufficiently "link the expert's conclusion (that the plaintiff might have had a better outcome) to the hospital's alleged breach (that it did not correctly read and act upon the x-rays)." Id. at 52-53. The report's causation element was addressed by the statement that "if the x-rays would have been correctly read and the appropriate medical personnel acted upon those findings then Wright would have had the possibility of a better outcome." An opinion that fails to provide information linking a conclusion (a patient's "better outcome") with the physician's alleged breach (incorrectly reading and acting on x-rays) is deficient because it is conclusory. Id. at 53. As the supreme court explained, an opinion that relies on inference, such as that the alleged breach precluded a quicker diagnosis and treatment, fails the good-faith standard. Id. In Bowie Mem'l Hosp. v. Wright, the trial court examined an expert's statement that had radiographs been correctly read and had appropriate personnel acted upon the findings, the patient would have had a better outcome. Bowie, 79 S.W.3d at 52-53. The court found that there was no language in the expert's report to indicate what specific failure to meet the applicable standards caused the injury to the patient. Id. at 53. As the basis for their malpractice claim, the plaintiff alleged the failure to diagnose the foot fracture and failure to properly review diagnostic tests. Id. To comply with the causation element, the report stated: "If the x-rays would have been correctly read and the appropriate medical personnel acted upon those findings then the plaintiff would have had the possibility of a better outcome." Id. at 52-53. The hospital defendant asserted that the report failed to adequately address the causation element between the alleged breach and the injury, and the trial court dismissed plaintiff's claims. Id. at 51. Acknowledging that experts need not invoke any particular "magical words" to demonstrate that the report met the good faith effort test as to the elements, the supreme court iterated the applicable standard of review: "We have held that the only information relevant to whether a report represents a good-faith effort to comply with the statutory requirements is the report itself. . . . And, we have held that we review a trial court's decision about whether a report constitutes a good-faith effort to comply with the Act under an abuse-of-discretion standard." Id. at 53. Based upon the standard of review, the supreme court then concluded that the trial court could have reasonably determined that the report was conclusory and did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the claims: "After reviewing this report, we conclude that the trial court could have reasonably determined that the report does not represent a good-faith effort to summarize the causal relationship between the hospital's failure to meet the applicable standards of care and the claimant's injury. . . . That is because the report simply opines that the claimant might have had "the possibility of a better outcome" without explaining how the hospital's conduct caused injury to the claimant. We cannot infer from this statement, as the claimant asks us to, that the hospital's alleged breach precluded the claimant from obtaining a quicker diagnosis and treatment for her foot. Rather, the report must include the required information within its four corners." Id.