In Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), a videotape provided "indisputable visual evidence contradicting essential portions" of the testimony of an officer who alleged that the appellant consented to a search. Id. at 332. As established by the videotape, "appellant was closely surrounded by four police officers who had him backed up against the hood of his car," "officers told appellant to turn around and put his hands on the car," and "only after appellant had assumed such position, and as the officer was reaching for appellant's pants, did the officer 'ask,' 'Mind if I pat you down again?" Id. Additionally, "appellant was never told during this exchange that he had a right to refuse consent" and appellant had already been voluntarily searched in an earlier frisk. Id. at 332-33. The court concluded that "a reasonable person would not have felt they had the choice to withhold consent to search" and, thus, appellant's consent was not voluntary. Id. at 333. In Carmouche v. State, the defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing, among other things, that the detaining officer's second search of the defendant, which ultimately led to the discovery of narcotics, was not justified. 10 S.W.3d at 327. At the suppression hearing, the detaining officer testified that the defendant had given him consent to conduct a second pat-down search. Id. However, the video from officer's patrol car camera, which captured the second pat-down, did not support the officer's testimony that the defendant consented to the search. Id. at 331-32. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. Id. at 327. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court could have implicitly found that the defendant gave consent for the second search based on the officer's testimony at the suppression hearing. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, reversed. Id. at 333. The court noted that, in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court must generally give almost total deference to the trial court's determinations of historical fact that are supported by the record. Id. at 332. The court, however, concluded that "in the unique circumstances of this case . . . we decline to give 'almost total deference' to the trial court's implicit findings under which the Court of Appeals found consent." Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court explained that "the nature of the evidence presented in the videotape does not pivot 'on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor,'" but instead "presents indisputable visual evidence contradicting essential portions of the officer's testimony." Id. The court concluded that "in these narrow circumstances, we cannot blind ourselves to the videotape evidence simply because the officer's testimony may, by itself, be read to support" a finding of consent. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed video evidence in determining whether the search of defendant was justified under the "consent" exception to the probable cause requirements. Id. at 331. The court concluded that "the nature of the evidence presented in the videotape does not pivot on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Rather, the videotape presents indisputable visual evidence contradicting essential portions of the officer's testimony." Id. at 332. The court noted the following from its review of the video evidence: "On the side of a darkened highway, appellant was closely surrounded by four police officers who had him backed up against the hood of his car. Officers told appellant to turn around and put his hands on the car. Only after appellant had assumed such position, and as he was reaching for appellant's pants, did the officer "ask," "Mind if I pat you down again?" Moreover, appellant was never told during this exchange that he had a right to refuse consent. Finally, appellant had already been searched once involuntarily during the earlier Terry frisk. Taken together with all of the other circumstances, this could have led a reasonable person to conclude that the second search, like the previous one, was not optional." Id. at 332-33 The court explained "we cannot blind ourselves to the videotape evidence simply because the officer's testimony may, by itself, be read to support the Court of Appeals' holding." Id. at 332. As a result of the court's review of the video evidence it held "that the record does not support the Court of Appeals' finding of clear and convincing evidence that appellant's consent, if given at all, was free and voluntary." Id. at 333.