In City of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310, 316, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 715 (Tex. 2004), the homeowners brought two claims, unconstitutional taking and nuisance, against the City of Dallas for damage to their property that resulted from the City's efforts to unclog a sewer line. Id. at 311. In affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, the Supreme Court determined that the City was not liable because there was no evidence the City "possessed the knowledge required to establish an intentional taking," and without the "requisite intent to be held liable under Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution," the City would also be immune from the homeowner's nuisance claim. Id. at 315-316. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court focused on the type of "intent" necessary to establish a takings claim under the Texas Constitution. Id. at 313-314. The Court rejected the homeowner's argument that "any" intentional act can give rise to liability because "when damage is merely the accidental result of the government's act, there is no public benefit and the property cannot be said to be 'taken or damaged for public use.'" Id. The Court also rejected the City's contention that it must necessarily intend to damage the property, stating, "if the government knows that the specific damage is substantially certain to result from its conduct, then takings liability may arise even when the government did not particularly desire the property to be damaged." Id. Ultimately, the Court set forth a standard in Jennings that comports with the definition of "intent" found in the Restatement of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8A (1965). The Court held that a governmental entity may be liable for an unconstitutional taking when it "(1) knows that a specific act is causing identifiable harm; or (2) knows that the specific property damage is substantially certain to result from an authorized government action - that is, that the damage is 'necessarily an incident to, or necessarily a consequential result of' the government's action." City of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310 at 314. The Court held that there was no evidence in Jennings that the City knew, when it undertook to unclog the sewer line, that its actions would cause damage or that damage was substantially certain to result. Id. at 315. The Court held that without the requisite knowledge, the affirmative action taken by the City was insufficient to establish an intentional taking, and, therefore, insufficient to supply the requisite intent for a nuisance claim under the Texas Constitution. Id. The plaintiffs sued for compensation for a taking under article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution. The issue in dispute was what level of intent or scienter is required on the part of the governmental entity before an act by the governmental entity that causes damage to property becomes a compensable "taking." The City contended that the "intentional act" component of an inverse condemnation claim meant that the damage itself must be intentional. However, the plaintiffs contended it required only that the act causing the damage be intentional. In its opinion, the court held as follows: "When a governmental entity physically damages private property in order to confer a public benefit, that entity may be liable under Article I, Section 17 if it (1) knows that a specific act is causing identifiable harm; or (2) knows that the specific property damage is substantially certain to result from an authorized government action . . . ." Id. at 314. The Texas Supreme Court further explained the type of intent that must be shown in order to establish the first element of an inverse-condemnation claim. It is not enough to show merely that the governmental entity intended to perform the act that resulted in the taking or the damage, because such a standard would hold the governmental entity to a stricter standard of liability than a private person engaging in the same acts. Id. Moreover, when damage is merely the accidental result of the government's intentional act, there is no public benefit and the property cannot be said to have been taken or damaged for public use. Id. The court held that a governmental entity "may be liable under Article I, Section 17 if it (1) knows that the specific act is causing identifiable harm; or (2) knows that the specific property damage is substantially certain to result from an authorized government action--that is, that the damage is necessarily an incident to, or necessarily a consequential result of the government's action." Id. at 314. In City of Dallas v. Jennings, the trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and denied the landowners' motion. Id. The landowners then appealed. Id. While the opinion is relevant to the government's intent, which the appellant must prove to establish a takings claim under Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution, the opinion is silent with respect to the details the plaintiff's petition must allege regarding intent to survive a challenge presented by a plea to the jurisdiction. Id. at 313-15. In Jennings, the Supreme Court held that "there was no evidence that the City possessed the knowledge required to establish an intentional taking . . . . " Id. at 315. As a result, the Jennings Court concluded that the trial court correctly granted the City's motion for summary judgment. Id. In sum, the City of Dallas dislodged a clogged sewer main, which resulted in a raw sewage flood in the Jennings's home. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 312. The court held that there was no evidence in Jennings that the City knew, when it undertook to unclog the sewer line, that its actions would cause damage or knew that damage was substantially certain to result. Id. at 315. The court held that without the requisite knowledge, the affirmative action taken by the City was insufficient to establish an intentional taking. Id. The Court determined a governmental entity can be liable for a taking if it knows a specific act is causing identifiable harm or knows with substantial certainty damages are necessarily an incident to or necessarily a consequential result of the government's actions. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 314. In that case, the supreme court held there was insufficient evidence that the city knew flooding would occur on the plaintiffs' property when it unclogged a sewer line. Id.