In Coco v. Port of Corpus Christi Authority, 132 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004), a longshoreman, John Coco, working for Dix Stevedores, fell from a crane owned by the Port and operated by Joe Hinojosa. Id. at 690. When Coco sued the Port of Corpus Christi, it moved for summary judgment arguing that Hinojosa was a borrowed servant of Dix Stevedores and that the Port was not liable for his torts. Id. at 691. The Port submitted as evidence its contract with Dix Stevedores, which provided that all equipment would "be operated under the direction and control of the User and that the User would be responsible for the operation thereof." Id. The trial court thus entered summary judgment in favor of the Port. Id. Coco appealed, arguing that despite the contract, several facts indicated that the Port had control over Hinojosa. Id. Coco cited the fact that the crane was owned and operated by the Port and that the Port's general superintendent oversaw the crane operators to ensure that the cranes were operated safely. Id. The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment in favor of the Port, stating that "it is well-settled law in Texas that contractual designations of control are not necessarily dispositive." Id. at 692. The court articulated that "a contractual designation of control will not establish borrowed servant status as a matter of law where evidence shows that the parties acted to the contrary." Id. at 692-93. It thus concluded that "even upon proof of a valid enforceable contract that designates control, summary judgment is improper where the non-movant raises fact issues showing that the parties acted in a manner not contemplated by their contract." Id. at 693.