In Coleman v. State, 145 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed a case in which the trial court had entered a deadly weapon finding in its judgment, yet there had been no testimony that Coleman had ever held or "exhibited" the weapon during the offense. Instead, the officers testified they found the 9-millimeter pistol and a .22 rifle inside Coleman's house, but they did not testify that Coleman had been seen displaying or exhibiting the weapon at the time the officers saw Coleman selling illegal narcotics. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals nevertheless affirmed the trial court's deadly weapon finding. Id. at 655. The court first expressly disagreed with Coleman's contention that "where no individual is observed in actual physical control over the weapon, and where the weapon is found a significant distance from the controlled substance, then the evidence is not sufficient to support an affirmative finding of use or exhibition of a deadly weapon during the commission of an alleged narcotics offense." Id. at 653-54. The court noted that an accused's distance from the weapon is not dispositive. Id. at 654. The court then emphasized that the evidence showed no one else had access to the home, the weapon was found in the same room with mail addressed to Coleman, and Coleman had told police that he lived in the house alone. Id. The Coleman court ultimately concluded the trial court did not err by entering an affirmative deadly weapon finding. In Coleman v. State, two officers were conducting narcotics surveillance of a suspect area when they saw the appellant drive up in a truck and park. After the officers witnessed individuals coming and going from the appellant's truck in a particular manner, the officers concluded that the appellant was involved in drug activity. Id. The officers contacted uniformed officers, who arrived and arrested appellant. Id. The officers searched appellant's truck, but found no narcotics. Id. With appellant's consent, the officers drove appellant to his house, where the officers opened the house door with appellant's key. Id. Appellant remained in the patrol car while the officers searched his house. Id. The officers found PCP and powdered cocaine all over the house and, from a front bedroom, the officers recovered a 9-millimeter pistol and a .22 rifle. Id. at 650-51. The jury in Coleman found that the appellant used a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm, during the commission of the offenses at issue. Id. at 651. On appeal, the appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support an affirmative finding on the deadly-weapon issue because he could not have used or exhibited the deadly weapons that were later found at his house, during the commission of the offenses. Id. at 651-52. The court of criminal appeals disagreed. The court explained that the word "exhibit" requires that a deadly weapon be consciously shown, displayed, or presented. Id. at 652. However, the word "use" requires only that a deadly weapon be "utilized, employed, or applied in order to achieve its intended result 'the commission of a felony offense or during immediate flight therefrom,'" and that "use" includes "any employment of a deadly weapon, even simple possession, if such possession facilitates the associated felony." Id. In addition, the court explained that "'during the commission of the offense' in a drug possession case means just that: while in possession of drugs with intent to deliver them, the defendant is committing the offense." Id. at 655. The court concluded that, although the defendant was not present during the search of his house, the evidence was sufficient to warrant a rational trier of fact to conclude that appellant used the weapons to protect the narcotics and the proceeds therefrom. Id. In a concurring opinion, outlined several factors addressed in various Texas and federal cases that courts can consider in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a deadly weapon finding. These factors include: (1) the type of gun involved; (2) whether or not the gun was loaded; (3) whether or not the gun was stolen; (4) the proximity of the gun to the drugs, drug paraphernalia, or drug manufacturing materials; (5) the accessibility of the gun to whomever controlled the premises; (6) the quantity of drugs involved; (7) any evidence that might demonstrate an alternative purpose for the presence of the guns. Id. at 659. The court held that a rational trier of fact could find that the defendant used the firearms to facilitate his possession and distribution of the drugs. Id. at 655. In a separate opinion concurring in the result, Judge Cochran stated that the simple possession of drugs and a firearm in the same general location is not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm was used to facilitate the possession of the drugs. Id. at 657 (Cochran, J., concurring).