In Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. 1998), the supreme court construed a deed under which provisions other than the granting clause gave rights to the grantee that, considered in the aggregate, amounted to a larger fraction of the mineral or royalty interest specified in the granting clause. See Concord Oil, 966 S.W.2d at 455. The opening paragraph of the deed described a 1/96th interest in the "estate" conveyed. Id. at 457. The second paragraph recited that "the estate hereby conveyed . . . covers and includes one-twelfth (1/12) of all rentals and royalty of every kind and character." Id. The supreme court concluded that the parties' intent was to convey a single estate that included 1/12th of rents and royalties. Id. at 459. The court reasoned that "if the estate were only a 1/96th interest in the minerals, it would cover and include only 1/96th of the rents and royalty. A 1/96th mineral interest could not 'cover and include one-twelfth (1/12) of all rentals and royalties.'" Id.