Criminal-Trespass In Educational Institutions
In Grody v. State, 257 Ind. 651, 278 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. 1972), the Indiana Supreme Court held that a criminal-trespass statute that applied only to educational institutions was unconstitutionally overbroad. See Grody, 278 N.E.2d at 282-83.
The statute at issue in Grody is distinguishable from the Texas criminal-trespass statute in two ways.
First, the Texas statute more clearly defines who may enforce its provisions by granting enforcement power to "the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner." Tex. Penal Code Ann. 30.05(b)(2)(A).
The Indiana statute allowed enforcement by "duly constituted officials." See Grody, 278 N.E.2d at 281.
Second, the Indiana statute expressly permitted an official to remove someone from an educational institution "regardless of reason." See id.
The Texas statute does not grant such unfettered discretion to those enforcing the statute.
The Grody court seemed particularly concerned that because the Indiana trespass statute expressly granted absolute enforcement authority to "officials," persons could be arrested for engaging in constitutionally protected activity. See Grody, 278 N.E.2d at 282-83.
The Texas statute is not so broadly drafted.
"A statute will not be invalidated for overbreadth merely because it is possible to imagine some unconstitutional applications." See Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 435 (Tex. 1998)