In Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), the court of criminal appeals restated the proper method to analyze the sufficiency of the evidence in cases where possession of an item is illegal. The court acknowledged what had been called an "affirmative links" test, but held that circumstantial evidence of possession could be sufficient evidence to connect a defendant to the actual care, custody, control or management of contraband when the "logical force of the circumstantial evidence, not the number of links" supported the jury's verdict. Id. at 163 n.12, 166. In that case, the court noted that the jury had already engaged in a weight of evidence determination-one which likely included an analysis of links between a defendant and the drugs-and that under "federal and Texas law, juries trump both trial and appellate judges on weight-of-evidence determinations." Id. at 164. The Court of criminal appeals noted that in a possession of a controlled substance prosecution, the State must prove: "(1) the accused exercised control, management, or care over the substance; and (2) the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband." Id. at 161. In articulating the "links" rule, the Evans court stated that: "Regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, it must establish that the defendant's connection with the drug was more than fortuitous. This is the so-called "affirmative links" rule which protects the innocent bystander--a relative, friend, or even stranger to the actual possessor--from conviction merely because of his fortuitous proximity to someone else's drugs. Mere presence at the location where drugs are found is thus insufficient, by itself, to establish actual care, custody, or control of those drugs. However, presence or proximity, when combined with other evidence, either direct or circumstantial (e.g., "links"), may well be sufficient to establish that element beyond a reasonable doubt. It is . . . not the number of links that is dispositive, but rather the logical force of all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial." Id. at 161-62. The court further noted that Texas courts have recognized a non-exclusive list of possible "links" as sufficient, "either singly or in combination, to establish a person's possession of contraband." Id. at 162 n.12. The list includes the following factors: (1) the defendant's presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant's proximity to and the accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; (14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt. Id. Finally, the court intimated that these are just "some factors which may circumstantially establish the legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove a knowing 'possession.' They are not a litmus test." Id.