In Ex parte Evans, 690 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), the applicant contended that his plea of guilty was involuntary because he had relied on his attorney's advice that he would be eligible for parole eighteen to twenty months after entering his plea.
He was in fact not eligible for parole until forty months had elapsed. Further, counsel had informed him that he would be eligible for parole after discharging one third of his sentence (correct), and could accumulate good time toward his sentence (correct), but also told him the good time would be taken into consideration in determining when he had served one third of his sentence (incorrect).
The Court of Criminal Appeals, citing federal authority, concluded that because of the ephemeral nature of parole and the multiple factors involved in obtaining or becoming eligible for parole, the speculative nature of parole attainment is such as to discount its legal importance on the subject of voluntariness of a guilty plea. This legal importance is discounted to the extent that erroneous advice of counsel on the subject of parole eligibility will not render the plea involuntary. (Ex parte Evans, 690 S.W.2d at 279.)