In Ex parte Serrato, 3 S.W.3d 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), the habeas applicant cited subsection 49.09(d) and argued that because his prior convictions occurred prior to September 1, 1994, and resulted in probated sentences, they were not final convictions and therefore could not be used for enhancement purposes. Id. at 42. The court of criminal appeals disagreed, pointing out that section 49.09 defines the offenses that could be used for enhancement purposes to include "an offense under Article 6701l-1, Revised Statutes, as that law existed before September 1, 1994." Id. at 42-43 (quoting Tex. Penal Code Ann. 49.09(c)(1)(C)). The court went on to point out that prior to September 1, 1994, article 6701l-1 defined a final conviction as a conviction for an offense occurring on or after January 1, 1984, whether or not the sentence for the conviction was probated. Id. at 43. Based on this language, the court held: "In light of the Legislature's specific intent to keep the law the same as its previous incarnation, we do not find applicant's contention to have merit. This section 49.09(d) was enacted to state that probated convictions under the new statute are considered final convictions. And by incorporating the prior DWI statute, as that law existed before enactment of the new statute, the Legislature declared its intent to continue the status quo, which included permitting probated DWI convictions for enhancement if the offense occurred after January 1, 1984. We hold that a probated DWI conviction which occurred after January 1, 1984, but prior to September 1, 1994, may properly be used to enhance a sentence" Id.