In Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 477 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1972), the Texas Supreme Court again considered the effect of a venue-selection agreement that contravened a mandatory venue statute. 477 S.W.2d at 535. In that case, Fidelity Union Life Insurance Company brought suit in Dallas County seeking to enjoin its former agent from violating his contract. Id. The agent's contract with Fidelity provided for venue of such an action in Dallas; however, the mandatory venue statute in effect at the time provided for mandatory venue in "the district or county court of the county in which the defendant has its domicile." Id. at 536. The agent filed a plea of privilege based on this statute. Id. The supreme court cited Int'l Travelers' Ass'n v. Branum, 109 Tex. 543, 212 S.W. 630 (Tex. 1919), noting its holding that "an advance agreement about venue may not contravene the statutory scheme for fixing venue." Id. The court's reasoning, however, included more justification than its earlier decision in Branum. See id. First, the court noted that the venue statutes at the time provided parties the right to agree to venue only when "the obligation sued upon is to be performed in the particular county of venue." Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, 5 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 15.035 (Vernon 2002))). The cases cited to the court by Fidelity as support for enforcing its venue-selection agreement were under this provision, and the court held they did not support Fidelity's position. Id. at 536-37. Second, the court discussed the Branum case and the policy reasons for enacting mandatory venue statutes. Id. at 537. Specifically, it noted that "venue is a matter of general convenience and expediency, whereas contracts which change the venue rules disturb the symmetry of the law." Id. It noted that the opinion of the court of civil appeals below, however, had articulated more policy reasons than those discussed in Branum. Id. Specifically, the court of civil appeals below noted that the legislature engages in a policy choice when it enacts venue rules, necessarily choosing to bestow more favor on either a plaintiff or defendant in particular cases: "A party litigating away from home has the same disadvantage whether he is plaintiff or defendant. When two parties live in different counties, only one can enjoy the home-county privilege. A choice must be made, and the legislature has chosen to give that privilege to defendant as a general rule, subject to enumerated exceptions, and no exception is provided for cases in which the parties have agreed to suit in a particular county. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., Art. 1995 (1964). In order to maintain suit away from defendant's residence, plaintiff has the burden to prove that his case falls within one of the exceptions, and doubts must be resolved in favor of the general rule. Moreover, the defendant's privilege of defending in his home county is such a valuable right that it must be protected even at the cost of two trials of the same issue. In Branum the public policy against permitting parties to contract away procedural rights was decisive in favor of a plaintiff who was entitled to a venue privilege under one of the exceptions. We hold that the same policy applies even more strongly to a defendant who is entitled to a venue privilege under the general rule. In this case, since we have also the mandatory provisions of Article 4656 requiring an injunction to be returnable to defendant's county, the policy against the contractual provision in question is especially strong." Fid. Union Ins. Co. v. Evans, 468 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas 1971), aff'd, 477 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1972). Based on this additional reasoning, the supreme court held that: "the fixing of venue by contract, except in such instances as permitted by Article 1995, 5, is invalid and cannot be the subject of a private contract. . . . Article 4656 placed venue for an injunction suit in the county in which defendant Evans had his domicile; we hold that a variance of that statute is not the subject of a private contract." Fid. Union Life Ins. Co., 477 S.W.2d at 537.