In Flores v. State, 33 S.W.3d 907, 919 (Tex. App.--Houston 14th Dist. 2000, pet. ref'd), the court held that an information alleging that the appellant "unlawfully intentionally and knowingly acted as an entertainer" in a sexually oriented enterprise without a permit did not set forth all of the material elements of the offense. Id. at 917-19. Flores applied the City of Houston Ordinance (not the Harris County Regulation applicable to the present case), which defined "entertainer" as "any employee of an enterprise who performs or engages in entertainment." Id. at 918. "Entertainment" was defined as "any act or performance . . . that involves the display or exposure of specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas or engaging in any specified sexual activities whatever in the presence of customers." Id. The court justified that the charging instrument in Flores needed to provide the specific act the accused was alleged to have performed that constituted "entertainment." Id. at 919 (holding "the display of specific sexual activities or exposure of specific anatomical areas refers to characteristics of the act or performance that criminalize the act or performance" and thus, are facts essential to give notice). However, the court in Flores expressly distinguished its holding from that in Kaczmarek v. State, which found a charging instrument to be sufficient that alleged the operation of a sexually oriented enterprise. Id. n.3 (citing Kaczmarek v. State, 986 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.--Waco 1999, no pet.)). The court explained that, in Kaczmarek, a manager was charged with operating a sexually oriented enterprise that provided "entertainment," but because "entertainment" in the charging instrument did not involve the defendant manager's conduct, it need not be stated with greater specificity. Id.