In Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), the court considered the case of a defendant who filed a motion to suppress evidence after being stopped for driving and "following too close." The trial court denied the motion and the court of appeals affirmed stating, "Trooper Peavy's experience and training qualified him to make a judgment on whether, 'considering the speed of the vehicles, traffic and the conditions of the highway,' Ford was following the car in front of him too closely." Id. at 492. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed finding that Trooper Peavy's testimony was a mere conclusion devoid of fact because the trooper only stated that the defendant was "following too close." Id. at 493. The Court of Criminal Appeals found an absence of evidence in the record to reveal any facts allowing an appellate court to determine the circumstances upon which the trooper could reasonably conclude that the defendant actually was, had been, or soon would have been engaged in criminal activity. Id. Trooper Andrew Peavy stopped Ford for following another car too closely and arrested Ford after findings drugs in the vehicle. See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 490-91. At a suppression hearing, Peavy testified that he saw Ford "following a white car, following too close." Id. at 491. The Court of Criminal Appeals found this testimony insufficient to support reasonable suspicion: "The evidence before the trial court indicated only that in Peavy's judgment, Ford was following another car too closely in violation of Transportation Code 545.062(a). The State failed to elicit any testimony pertinent to what facts would allow Peavy to objectively determine Ford was violating a traffic law in support of his judgment." Id. at 494. The Court of criminal appeals held that the officer's vague testimony that the defendant's car followed another vehicle too closely was, without more, insufficient to justify the detention. Id. The court explained that the testimony, "following too close," by itself, was not sufficiently specific to show that the defendant "actually was, had been, or soon would have been engaged in criminal activity." Id. The court of appeals specifically reasoned that the officer's training and experience qualified him to make a judgment regarding whether the defendant was violating the law by following the other vehicle too closely given the conditions present on the roadway. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, however, holding that the officer's testimony was conclusory and failed to offer specific, articulable facts that a court could use in assessing whether the officer's opinion was objectively reasonable. Id. at 493-94. he Court acknowledged that an officer's training and experience may factor into the analysis but stated that relying on those factors without objective factual support was inappropriate. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that an officer's "conclusory statement" that a defendant was "following too close" behind another vehicle could not support a finding of reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493. Because reasonable suspicion requires specific, articulable facts that would lead an officer to conclude that a particular person is, has been, or will be engaged in criminal activity, the Court held the officer's testimony was insufficient due to its lack of objective factual support. Id. at 493-94. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated the well-recognized principle that reasonable suspicion exists if an officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude that a particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. 158 S.W.3d at 492.