In Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2011), the Texas Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment proof failed to establish as a matter of law that a resident physician was an employee of a governmental unit. Id. at 375. Dr. Reddy, the resident physician, argued that section 312.007(a) of the health and safety code made her a government employee for purposes of the Texas Tort Claims Act. She delivered the medical care at issue at University Hospital, a public teaching hospital owned and operated by the Bexar County Hospital District (the Bexar County District) doing business as the University Health System. The hospital was staffed with medical faculty, resident physicians, and students of the University of Texas Health Science Center. Dr. Reddy was a resident physician in the Center's program under a three-party "Graduate Medical Education Agreement," in which she, the Center (a governmental unit), and the Bexar County District (a governmental unit) agreed the Bexar County District would compensate her but would have no legal right to control the details of her work. Id. at 373. Dr. Reddy acknowledged that the applicability of health and safety code section 312.007(a) was conditioned on the existence of an agreement prescribed by section 312.003, and she argued that the "Graduate Medical Education Agreement" was such an agreement on its face. However, a supported medical or dental school was not a party to the agreement, and the record did not reflect whether the "Graduate Medical Education Agreement, or even the program it facilitated" was approved by the Texas Board of Health under the health and safety code. Id. at 375. The Court stated that "section 101.106(f)'s (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code) two conditions are met in almost every negligence suit against a government employee" 332 S.W.3d at 381, but noted that "whether an employee's intentional tort is within the scope of employment is a more complex issue." Id. at n.63. The court cited generally to section 7.07 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency. Id. The Court held that "for section 101.106(f), suit 'could have been brought' under the Texas Tort Claims Act against the government regardless of whether the Act waives immunity from suit." While the supreme court acknowledged that its construction of section 101.106(f) "forecloses suit against a government employee in his individual capacity if he was acting within the scope of employment," it concluded that such construction was compelled by the statute's text and the court's own precedent. Id. at 381-82.