In Howland v. State, 990 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), the indictment was returned before the effective date of the original version of Article 38.37. See id. at 275. Howland argued that although his trial took place after the effective date, its provisions did not apply to the admission of evidence at his trial, because his prosecution commenced with his indictment before the effective date. Id. The pertinent enactment paragraph provided that the article was applicable "to any criminal proceeding that commences on or after the effective date of this Act . . . ." Act of May 28, 1995, R.S., ch. 318, 48(b), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2734, 2748-49 (amended 2005, 2011, 2013). The court noted that Section 1 of Article 38.37 stated that the article applied to a "proceeding in the prosecution of a defendant." Howland, 990 S.W.2d at 276. By this language, "the rule itself expressly distinguishes between a "proceeding" and a "prosecution" in a way that implies that there can be more than one proceeding in a given case." Id. at 277 (quoting Haney v. State, 977 S.W.2d 638, 649-50 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref'd) (Livingston, J., concurring)). Based upon this distinction, the court of criminal appeals in Howland interpreted "any criminal proceeding" to mean that the act applied to "every step required to be taken in a prosecution of a defendant" and therefore to Howland's trial. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined the applicability of Section 1 of Article 38.37 to the trial of a defendant who was indicted before the effective date of the statute, but who was tried after the effective date. Howland, 990 S.W.2d at 275. Section 1 provided that it "'applies to a proceeding in a prosecution of a defendant,'" and the enactment provision stated that it was applicable "'to any criminal proceeding that commences on or after the effective date.'" Id. at 276 (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.37). The court focused its analysis on the meaning of "proceeding" and noted that Black's Law Dictionary recognizes two competing meanings: proceeding could "'describe the entire course of an action at law'" or "'every step required to be taken in any cause by either party.'" Id. at 276 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1024 (Centennial & 6th ed. 1990)). Since the entire course of an action at law "means the same thing as or would encompass 'a prosecution,'" the court held that "the phrase 'a proceeding in a prosecution,' in Section 1 refers on its face to one of the individual or smaller 'steps or measures' that may be taken within the larger criminal prosecution." Id. at 277. The court went on to hold that "construed in light of this reading of section one, the enactment paragraph's reference to 'any criminal proceeding' logically refers to 'any' of the many steps that might occur within the process of a prosecution." Id. However, the court went on to specifically note: "We recognize that the phrase "criminal proceeding" might, taken alone, be interpreted as an entire course of a prosecution. However, this phrase takes on a different meaning when construed in light of the language utilized in the article itself and in light of the use of the term "any" preceding it." Id. at 277 n.6. Thus, the Howland court based its construction of "any criminal proceeding" in the enactment provision of Section 1 on the specific language used in Section 1 ("a proceeding in a prosecution"), its construction of the use of "proceeding" in Section 1, and the use of the modifier "any" preceding "criminal proceeding." Id. at 276-77.