In In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. 2006), DFPS filed proceedings to terminate parental rights on January 23, 2003 and was named temporary managing conservator of the children. 210 S.W.3d at 611. In September, 2003, the court identified the dismissal date for DFPS's case as January 26, 2004, and set the case for trial on the merits. Id. In January, 2004, unlike here, it timely "extended the dismissal date to July 24, 2004, as permitted by section 263.401(b) of the Texas Family Code." Id. Trial began on July 19, 2004, but had not terminated by the dismissal date. Seeing that the dismissal date was about to run without rendition of a final order, the mother against whom the suit had been filed and an intervening great-grandmother timely filed motions to dismiss under section 263.402 on July 22, 2004. Id. They continued to participate in the trial, however; and, on July 28, 2004--after the dismissal date--the jury returned a verdict terminating parental rights and naming DFPS the sole managing conservator of the children. Id. The trial court read the verdict from the bench and denied the motions to dismiss. Id. On August 13, 2004, the trial court rendered judgment by signing and filing the decree of termination. Id. Two days earlier, the mother and intervenor had filed petitions for mandamus in the appellate court seeking to compel the trial court to dismiss the case. Id. The supreme court held that a party could obtain dismissal under section 263.402 either by filing a motion to dismiss before the Department introduced all of its evidence or by filing a motion requesting the court to render a final order before the dismissal date. Id. at 613. Because the parties' motions to dismiss met those criteria, the trial court erred in not dismissing the cases. Id. Finally, the supreme court considered whether the court of appeals correctly determined that the parties had no adequate remedy by appeal and were therefore entitled to mandamus relief. Id. It concluded that because the trial was already underway when the dismissal deadline passed and physical possession of the children had passed to DFPS before the mandamus was filed, an accelerated appeal provided an adequate remedy and that the court of appeals erred in granting mandamus relief. Id. at 613-14. In In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., the Court addressed the availability of mandamus relief when a trial court abuses its discretion in not dismissing a case under former section 263.401. Id. In that case, the supreme court recognized that "justice demands a speedy resolution in cases involving child custody" and that an "appeal is frequently inadequate to protect the rights of parents and children," but the supreme court further noted that section 263.405 of the Texas Family Code provided for an accelerated appeal of a final order rendered under that subchapter and that this section shortened appellate deadlines, expedited the filing of the appellate record, and required the appellate court to render its final order or judgment with the least possible delay. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 263.405 (Vernon Supp. 2007)). In concluding that the accelerated appeal provided the parents in the case before it with an adequate remedy, the supreme court noted that the parents had filed their motions to dismiss during the trial and that physical possession of the children had already passed to TDFPS. Id. However, the court cautioned that it was not holding that a party "could never be entitled to mandamus relief" for a trial court's failure to dismiss under section 263.401, and it specifically noted that an impending transfer of physical possession of children or an unreasonable delay in entering a final decree might support mandamus relief. Id. Nevertheless, on the facts before it, the court emphasized that the parents could have initiated the accelerated appeal "at worst two days after they filed their petitions for writ of mandamus" and, thus, they had an adequate appellate remedy. Id. at 614.