In Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2003), an air conditioning repairman sued a commercial tenant for injuries he claimed to sustain in a fall from the roof of the tenant's building.Pitzner, 106 S.W. 3d at 725-26. At issue was whether the repairman produced "legally sufficient evidence that the alleged premises defects proximately caused his injuries."Id. The repairman remembered nothing. Id. at 726. His injuries were consistent with a fall, but also with assault and battery. Id. at 729. The Supreme Court of Texas found that due to a lack of evidence on the element of proximate cause, the factfinder could only speculate as to: (1) whether the repairman had actually fallen from the roof; (2) whether he actually came into contact with a high-voltage wire on the roof, causing him to stumble; (3) whether and how the lack of a power disconnect on the roof was a substantial factor in causing the injuries. Id. The Court concluded that Pitzner presented only "slight circumstantial evidence," and "something else must be found in the record to corroborate the probability of the fact's existence or non-existence." Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed and rendered a take nothing judgment, emphasizing that there was "no evidence that the condition of Marathon's premises proximately caused Pitzner's injuries."