In Parker v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 95 S.W.3d 428 (Tex.App.--Houston 1st Dist. 2002, no pet.), the decedent opened two investment accounts at the bank. The account receipts indicated that the accounts were payable on death (P.O. D.) and described Parker as the primary beneficiary. The decedent did not sign the written agreement to establish a P.O.D. account. Following the decedent's death, Parker attempted to collect the proceeds of the two accounts but was instructed that she was required to furnish a copy of the death certificate. Before Parker returned, the executrix delivered letters testamentary to the bank, withdrew the proceeds, and closed the accounts. Initially, the bank believed the funds had mistakenly been paid to the executrix and it filed an action to recover the funds. Upon discovering that the P.O.D. agreement had not been signed, the bank non-suited its action against the executrix. Parker then sued the bank to recover the funds. The bank moved for summary judgment on the ground that the decedent failed to sign the required P.O.D. agreement. Parker relied on the bank's judicial assertions that a P.O.D. account had been created to resist summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the bank. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that it could not consider the bank's judicial assertions because Section 439(a) required it to look exclusively at the P.O.D. agreement to discern whether a P.O.D. account had been created. Parker, 95 S.W.3d at 431.