In Pecina v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered how the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel are invoked and how they apply to custodial interrogation. See id. at 74-75. The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from compelling a criminal suspect to incriminate himself. Id. (citing U.S. Const. amend. V which states, "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."). Before questioning a suspect who is in custody, police must give the suspect Miranda warnings. Id. at 75. Only if the person voluntarily and intelligently waives his Miranda rights, including his right to have an attorney present during interrogation, may his statement be introduced into evidence against him at trial. Id. Under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), once a person has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, police may not re-initiate interrogation; police may not badger a person into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights. Id. (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485). But Miranda rights can only be invoked within the context of custodial interrogation. Id. at 75-76. The Supreme Court of the United States has never accepted anticipatory invocation of Miranda rights (1) given by someone other than law-enforcement officers or other state agents; or (2) outside the context of custodial interrogation. Id. at 76 (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1991)). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches once the adversary judicial process has been initiated, and it guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all critical stages of the criminal proceedings, including custodial interrogation. Id. at 77 (citing Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786). Under Montejo, if an accused who requested counsel at an arraignment or other initial appearance also wishes to invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during post-arraignment custodial interrogation, he may do so by invoking his Miranda rights at the outset of custodial interrogation. Id. at 78. A defendant's invocation of his right to counsel at the time of magistration says nothing about his possible invocation of his right to counsel during a subsequent police-initiated custodial interrogation. Id. In Pecina, paramedics responded to a 911 call and found Pecina and his wife in their apartment bleeding from stab wounds. Id. at 71. Pecina's wife died before the paramedics arrived and police believed Pecina had killed his wife, then stabbed himself. Id. While Pecina was still in the hospital, an arrest warrant was obtained and a magistrate visited Pecina in his room. Id. The magistrate arraigned Pecina and then asked him if he wanted a court-appointed attorney and if he wanted to talk to the Arlington Police Department detectives who were waiting outside his hospital room. Id. at 72. Pecina stated he wanted a court-appointed attorney. Id. Pecina also responded that he wanted to speak with the detectives and never indicated to the magistrate that he wanted an attorney present when he spoke with the detectives. Id. The magistrate then exited the room. Id. The detectives entered Pecina's hospital room, and after Pecina received his Miranda warnings and waived his Miranda rights, he gave the police a recorded statement. Id. Later, trial counsel was appointed to represent him. Id. at 73. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that because the defendant never invoked his right to counsel during the custodial interrogation, the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress the admission of his statement into evidence at trial. Id. at 81.